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Foreword
by John Dugard
Gaza is in the forefront of today’s news. Whether it be because of Palestinians
firing rockets into the neighbouring town of Sderot or because of Israeli
Defence Forces attacks that cause heavy loss of life and destruction in Gaza,
Gaza is seldom out of the news. The rift between Fatah and Hamas that has
resulted in the separation of the Palestinian territory into two is another source
of regular news. Events of this kind tend to obscure the dispute which is
central to an understanding of the ‘Gaza problem’ - whether Gaza remains
‘occupied’ territory, with all the consequences this entails, or whether it has
ceased to be ‘occupied’ territory since the withdrawal of Israeli forces and
settlers in August 2005.
Israel maintains that Gaza ceased to be occupied territory when it withdrew
its forces in 2005 and that Gaza is now a ‘hostile entity’, whatever this may
mean, which may be subjected to military attacks in the name of self-defence,
and in respect of which no humanitarian obligations arise. The United Nations
and most of the international community take a very different position. For
them Gaza was militarily occupied by Israel in 1967 and remains occupied
territory, despite the withdrawal of Israeli forces.
This means that Israel is bound by the provisions of international humanitarian
law, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention, which oblige the occupying
power to provide for the humanitarian needs of the occupied people and to
desist from collective punishment of the people in the name of self-defence.
Essentially the dispute centres on the question of effective control. If Israel
continues to exercise effective control over the territory it remains an occupying
power. If not, it has ceased to be a military occupant.
Sander Dikker Hupkes‘ excellent study examines the issues pertaining to both
military occupation in general and the occupation of Gaza in particular. It
provides an examination of the evolution of the rules of international law
governing occupation from the nineteenth century to the present day, with
special emphasis on the Hague regulations of 1899 and 1907, the jurisprudence
of Nuremberg and the Fourth Geneva Convention. Having laid the legal
framework, Dikker Hupkes then proceeds to the question whether Israel
exercises effective control over Gaza despite the fact that it no longer has a
permanent military presence in the territory. No study of this kind can confine
itself to the applicable rules of law. On the other hand, no such study can
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examine the factual situation without regard to the governing legal rules. The
present study succeeds in portraying the law through the facts and the facts
through the law. It is essential reading for anyone wishing to obtain a clear
and accurate understanding of the conflict over Gaza. Without such an under-
standing public opinion will be uninformed and unable to contribute to the
resolution of a dispute that threatens world peace and the governance of
occupied territories in accordance with humanitarian law.
John Dugard
Formerly Professor of International Law at Leiden University and Special Rapporteur
to the Human Rights Council on the Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Palesti-
nian Territory
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Introduction
An essay on the law of occupation and the Gaza Strip; a (un)timely subject
The Israeli-Palestine conflict is one of the greatest challenges to international
law today. The law’s vision is blurred by the complex history of the conflict,
as well as the strong political and religious convictions of the parties involved.
As a result, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) form an
unique testing ground for issues of contemporary international law. In my
view, complex conflicts such as this must be treated by international lawyers,
academic or otherwise, in the most objective way possible in order to be able
to find some legal truths under the veil of politics. This is of course difficult
when one deals with a conflict which has been highly politicized since its
origin. In a conflict so strongly divided into two main sides, it is almost
impossible to remain ‘in the middle’. Still, in the essay now before you I
attempted to do just that, while not preventing myself from drawing my own
conclusions from what in my view constitutes the law and the relevant facts.
1 CHOICE AND SCOPE OF SUBJECT MATTER
This essay deals with the part of international humanitarian law known as
the law of occupation. The focus will be on what exactly constitutes and ends
occupation, rather than on the rights and duties derived from the law of
occupation. The relevance of this subject matter was fueled in 2005 by a
historical event; the unilateral evacuation of Israeli armed forces and the Israeli
colonists from the Gaza Strip. This evacuation, which was completed on 12
September 2005, followed from the implementation of the Israeli Disengage-
ment Plan of 6 June 2004.
Unfortunately, from 25 June 2006 onwards, the situation in the Gaza Strip
deteriorated rapidly. This was the direct consequence of the capture of an
Israeli soldier by Palestinian extremists based in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli
armed forces started a heavy offensive on Gaza Strip territory to retrieve their
missing soldier. These events blurred the legal status of the Gaza Strip even
further, since Israeli armed forces once again moved into the Gaza Strip.
At the time of writing, March 2008, the situation in the Gaza Strip has
become even more worrying, to say the least. IDF forces are fighting in the
Gaza Strip on a daily basis, while the humanitarian situation of the Palestinian
civilians is alarming due to serious shortages in basic necessities such as food,
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medicine and fuel for the power generators. This will be elaborated upon later
in this chapter.
From the viewpoint of the international law of occupation, the period after
the implementation of the Israeli Disengagement Plan, but prior to the capture
of the Israeli soldier is the most interesting period. In that period, Israel arguab-
ly had the least control over the Gaza Strip since its occupation in 1967. For
the benefit of the legal analysis of the law of occupation and the subsequent
factual analysis of the situation in the Gaza Strip, this essay is based on the
facts as they presented themselves between 12 September 2005 and 25 June
2006. Thus, in this essay the (past) situation in the Gaza strip is used as a case
study to test and illustrate the conclusions in this essay.
As a result, the more recent developments in the Gaza Strip are not taken
into account. Nevertheless, I think it is necessary to provide at least a brief
overview of the current state of affairs, to further illustrate some of the con-
clusions drawn in the subsequent chapters.
2 CURRENT FACTUAL SITUATION IN THE GAZA STRIP
Firstly, it is important to provide a brief factual account of the recent situation
as it is presented in numerous authoritative sources. Since June 2006, there
have been many reports of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Gaza
Strip. One of the most recent of these reports, which was drawn up by a
coalition of humanitarian and human rights organizations, states that the
humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip is the worst since 1967.1 Most reports
identify Israeli policy as one of the main reasons for this deterioration.
Israeli control over the Gaza Strip through military activities and incursions
There are numerous reports of recent military actions in the Gaza Strip carried
out by the IDF.2 These actions were often in response to the indiscriminate
rocket attacks on Israel by Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip and directed
towards those militants. The Israeli military actions, executed from the ground
as well as from the air, resulted in numerous casualties and wounded. Accord-
ing to several authoritative sources, like the ICRC and the HRC, there were
numerous civilians among the victims.3 There are also reports of destruction
1 Oxfam a.o. Coalition Report 03/2008.
2 OCHA 27/02/08-03/03/08; Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of January 2008, p. 8-9;
UN press release 23/01/08 (HRC 6th Special Session); BBC 13/03/08; Amnesty International
03/03/08; PHR-Israel /0303/08; HRW 07/02/08; PHR-Israel, Al Mezan & GCMHP 24/
01/08; Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of August 2007, p. 8.
3 ICRC Report 07/03/08; UN-HRC Res. A/HRC/7/L.1; Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard
of August 2007, p. 9-10; BBC 13/03/08; Amnesty International 03/03/08; HRW 07/02/08;
PHR-Israel, Al Mezan & GCMHP 24/01/08.
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of houses and civilian property, as well as medical facilities and vehicles.4
Sections of the Gaza Strip are designated as “no-go” zones, which the IDF
enforces strictly with lethal force.5
Israeli Control over the Gaza Strip through closure of its borders for electricity, fuel,
humanitarian aid and (medical) supplies
Israel frequently cuts off power supplies to the Gaza Strip. Although the Israeli
Supreme Court approved these power cuts in January 2008,6 numerous sources
state that the power cuts, together with the closure of all borders, amount to
a form of collective punishment under international humanitarian law.7 The
power cuts already resulted in a strongly diminished availability of drinking
water for the population, diminished capacity and closure of hospital wards,
nonfunctioning of essential medical equipment, and inadequate sewage treat-
ment and waste disposal.8
Israel has closed down the Gaza borders for goods and people more and
more often, especially after Hamas seized power in the Gaza Strip in June
2007.9 Only humanitarian equipment and basic food supplies are allowed into
the Gaza Strip by Israel. In deciding which goods are allowed into the Gaza
Strip in order to maintain a ‘minimum humanitarian standard’, Israeli author-
ities maintain a very strict definition of what comprises ‘essential humanitarian
assistance’.10 Furthermore, Israel often places such a stringent closure upon
the border crossings of the Gaza Strip, that all food, fuel and medicines are
refused entry. This includes humanitarian aid and spare parts for medical
equipment.11 According to authoritative sources, more then 80 percent of the
4 Joint Statement UN Organisations, 13/06/07; OCHA 27/02/08-03/03/08; Amnesty Inter-
national 03/03/08; PHR-Israel 03/03/08.
5 Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of January 2008, p. 8.
6 ISC H.C. 9132/07 (30/01/08).
7 UN-HRC Res. A/HRC/7/L.1; UN press release 23/01/08 (HRC 6th Special Session); Report
of Special Rapporteur Dugard of August 2007, p. 10-11; Oxfam a.o. Coalition Report 03/2008,
p. 6, 13; HRW 07/02/08; GCMHP 22/01/08; Amnesty International 21/01/08; PHR-Israel,
Al Mezan & GCMHP 24/01/08; B’Tselem Report 2007, p. 15, 18.
8 ICRC Report 07/03/08; OCHA 27/02/08-03/03/08; OCHA – Holmes press release 15/02/
08; OCHA 18-24/01/08; Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of January 2008, p. 12; Oxfam
a.o. Coalition Report 03/2008, p. 9-10; GCMHP 22/01/08; Amnesty International 21/01/08;
HRW 07/02/08; PHR-Israel, Al Mezan & GCMHP 24/01/08; B’Tselem Report 2007, p. 15.
9 OCHA 18-24/01/08; Oxfam a.o. Coalition Report 03/2008, p. 8; HRW 07/02/08; B’Tselem
Report 2007, p. 16.
10 OCHA – Holmes press release 15/02/08; UN press release 23/01/08 (HRC 6th Special
Session); Oxfam a.o. Coalition Report 03/2008, p. 8; HRW 07/02/08; B’Tselem Report 2007,
p. 15; PHR-Israel 01/11/07.
11 OCHA 18-24/01/08; Oxfam a.o. Coalition Report 03/2008, p. 7; GCMHP 22/01/08; Amnesty
International 21/01/08; HRW 07/02/08; PHR-Israel 01/11/07.
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population in the Gaza Strip is dependent on humanitarian aid for their basic
food supplies.12
The medical supplies of the hospitals and physicians of the Gaza Strip are
running low and are mostly dependent on support from the ICRC.13 Essential
medical equipment is not present or not functional due to the lack of spare
parts.14 Due to the closure of the borders for persons, it is very difficult for
the population of Gaza to receive medical treatment which is not available
in the Gaza Strip. A medical referral to an Israeli hospital is not sufficient to
assure entry into Israel and there are reports of patients dying because of
this.15
Other forms of Israeli control over the Gaza Strip
The closure of the borders resulted in a further deterioration of the economic
situation in the Gaza Strip: factories were forced to close down and con-
struction projects to be put on hold due to shortage in material, and unemploy-
ment rates increased dramatically.16 Export of agricultural produce has nearly
ceased.17
According to numerous sources, Israel still controls Gaza’s airspace and
territorial waters and evidently also the external land perimeters.18 Israel still
collects taxes like the VAT on behalf of the Palestinian Authority.19 These
taxes are for example used to pay for the electricity that Israel sells to Gaza.20
Israel exercises significant control over the financial situation in the Gaza Strip
through its banking facilities and currency regulation.21 As is clear from the
facts as presented above, Israel exercises significant control over the supply
12 OCHA – Holmes press release 15/02/08; UN press release 23/01/08 (HRC 6th Special
Session); Oxfam a.o. Coalition Report 03/03/08, p. 7; B’Tselem Report 2007, p. 13.
13 ICRC Report 07/03/08; OCHA 27/02/08-03/03/08; Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard
of January 2008, p. 12; PHR-Israel 03/03/08; B’Tselem Report 2007, p. 12; PHR-Israel 01/11/
07.
14 OCHA – Holmes press release 15/02/08; Amnesty International 03/03/08.
15 Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of January 2008, p. 9, 11; UN press release 23/01/08
(HRC 6th Special Session); Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of August 2007, p. 10;
Oxfam a.o. Coalition Report 03/2008, p. 11; PHR-Israel 03/03/08; Amnesty International
21/01/08; B’Tselem Report 2007, p. 17; PHR-Israel 01/11/07.
16 ICRC Report 07/03/08; Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of January 2008, p. 11; Report
of Special Rapporteur Dugard of August 2007, p. 11; Oxfam a.o. Coalition Report 03/2008,
p. 8; HRW 07/02/08; B’Tselem Report 2007, p. 16.
17 Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of August 2007, p. 11; Oxfam a.o. Coalition Report
03/2008, p. 8; B’Tselem Report 2007, p. 16.
18 Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of January 2008, p. 8; Report of Special Rapporteur
Dugard of August 2007, p. 8; Oxfam a.o. Coalition Report 03/2008, p. 13; HRW 07/02/08;
B’Tselem Report 2007, p. 13.
19 Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of August 2007, p. 8; B’Tselem Report 2007, p. 13.
20 HRW 07/02/08.
21 Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of January 2008, p. 10; CIA World Fact Book.
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of electricity and fuel to the Gaza Strip. It also has control over the sewage
and telecommunication networks and the population registry.22
Assessing the Israeli control over the Gaza Strip
The facts as described above are highly relevant for the determination whether
or not the Gaza Strip is still under Israeli occupation. For this introduction
it suffices to state that, in my opinion, it is absolutely clear that the Gaza Strip
is still under Israeli occupation to this date. This legal determination is based
on the theory as set out in Part I of this essay on what constitutes occupation
under international humanitarian law. This is further clarified in Part II of
this essay by a similar, albeit more elaborate assessment to the one made above
of the factual situation in the Gaza Strip, regarding the period between Septem-
ber 2005 and June 2006.
For the basis of the assertion that the Gaza Strip is still occupied, I gladly
refer to these subsequent parts. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that this
assertion is supported by the UN organizations working in the OPT,23 the UN
Human Rights Council,24 the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in the OPT25 and numerous NGO’s.26 Also interesting to note is that
in its resolutions on the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the
UN General Assembly makes mention of the Gaza Strip and of Israel’s dis-
engagement, but refrains from stating that this resulted in the end of the
occupation.27
Nevertheless, Israel refuses to accept the status of occupied territory for
the Gaza Strip and instead has officially designated it as a “hostile entity”,
by virtue of a decision of the Israeli Security Cabinet on 19 September 2007.28
In consequence, Israel asserts that numerous punitive measures, directed at
the population of Gaza, are allowed.29 Thus, this claimed legal status intends
to legalize the measures which are designated by many as collective punish-
ment, as was shown above.
The research for the theoretical part (part I) of this essay was concluded
in November 2006. Therefore, subsequent publications on the subject are not
taken into account. However, one report was brought to my attention as it
was referred to by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights
22 Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of January 2008, p. 8; Report of Special Rapporteur
Dugard of August 2007, p. 8; HRW 07/02/08; B’Tselem Report 2007, p. 13-14.
23 Joint Statement UN Organisations, 13/06/07.
24 UN press release 23/01/08 (HRC 6th Special Session); UN-HRC Res. A/HRC/7/L.1.
25 Report of special Rapporteur Dugard of January 2008, p. 7-8; Report of special Rapporteur
Dugard of August 2007, p. 6.
26 Oxfam a.o. Coalition Report 03/2008, p. 6; PHR-Israel 03/03/08; HRW 07/02/08; PHR-Israel,
Al Mezan & GCMHP 24/01/08; B’Tselem Report 2007, p. 17.
27 UNGA Res 62/181; UNGA Res 62/108.
28 Israel MFA press release 19/09/07; Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of January 2008,
p. 8; B’Tselem Report 2007, p. 14.
29 B’Tselem Report 2007, p. 14.
6 Introduction
in the OPT in several of his reports.30 The report referred to was issued by
the Israel-based NGO Gisha, the Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, and
is titled “Disengaged Occupiers: The Legal Status of Gaza” (January 2007).31
As does the essay now before you, it deals with the legal status of the Gaza
Strip from the viewpoint of the law of occupation. This report also deals with
significant parts of the factual and legal considerations made in subsequent
chapters of this essay and reaches the same conclusions. The most important
conclusions of the Gisha report, and of this essay, are the following. Whether
a situation constitutes occupation is a factual determination, the relevant test
for which is whether there exists ‘effective control’ over the territory which
is assumed to be occupied. This form of control is construed more broadly
then the mere physical presence of military forces or of institutions acting as
government. It deals with control over government functions and control over
the wellbeing of the population.32 The factual determination of the situation
in the Gaza Strip can lead to only one conclusion: the Gaza Strip is, and has
been since 1967, territory occupied by Israel.
3 STRUCTURE OF THIS ESSAY
Before concluding this introductory chapter I would like to clarify the structure
of the present essay. In Part I of this essay, a theoretical analysis will be made
of the law of occupation, focusing on what exactly constitutes occupation. As
will become clear in this essay, it is my view that two different definitions
of occupation exist: (1) occupation in the meaning of the Hague Regulations
and (2) occupation in the meaning of the Fourth Geneva Convention. While
it is relatively clear what constitutes occupation in the meaning of the Hague
Regulations, the definition of occupation in the meaning of the Fourth Geneva
Convention is not so clear. Nevertheless, I have tried to formulate a usable
set of criteria for determining whether factual situations can be considered
as occupation in the meaning of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Both defini-
tions are summarized in the conclusion of Part I.
In Part II of this essay, the focus will be on the factual situation in the Gaza
Strip, up until 25 June 2006. The status of the Gaza Strip prior to the Dis-
engagement is discussed, as well as the contents of the Israeli Disengagement
Plan, which is annexed to this essay. After analysis of the Disengagement Plan,
the factual implementation of that plan is evaluated by means of reports of
the media, international organizations and human rights organizations.
30 Report of special Rapporteur Dugard of January 2008, p. 8; Report of special Rapporteur
Dugard of August 2007, p. 8.
31 Gisha Report 01/2007.
32 Gisha Report 01/2007, p. 69-74, 76-80, 98-99.
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In a final conclusion, the theory as discussed in Part I is applied to the
practice as discussed in Part II.
4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank much to many for making the publication of this essay possible. I thank
legal bookstore Jongbloed and the E.M. Meijers Institute for making this
publication possible and the Law Faculty of Leiden University for deeming
it worthy of publishing. Family and friends with whom I discussed the topic
and other people who inspired or challenged me; acknowledgement goes out
to all of them. One person I would like to mention in particular and that is
Professor John Dugard. He was my mentor during the development of the
manuscript and I can honestly say that he inspired and challenged me the
most of all, especially to make this essay a thorough and well-founded legal
work. I can only hope I have succeeded in this; I gladly leave that evaluation
up to the reader.
The Hague, March 2008

Part I

1 The development of the international law of
occupation
In this chapter I will briefly discuss the most important developments in the
law of occupation. After dealing with the concept of occupation from the early
times until the 19th century, I will discuss the main instruments which contri-
buted to the contemporary international law of occupation. I will pay specific
attention to the views expressed in the different instruments about what exactly
constitutes occupation. The instruments that I will discuss are the following:
The Lieber Code of 1863, the Brussels Code of 1874 and the Oxford Code of
1880.
1.1 THE EARLY PRACTICE OF OCCUPATION AND ANNEXATION
The gaining control over land resulting from warfare is as old as war itself.
Until the 19th century, the military occupation of territory made that territory
the property of the occupying sovereign. No rules obliged the occupant to
treat the occupied territory with special care. In those days occupation was
seen as a legitimate way of gaining territory and was not really distinct from
annexation.33 Since there was no real distinction between these forms of con-
trol there were no specific rules concerning occupation as we know it, and
the question when territory was effectively occupied according to those
standards is thus irrelevant for this essay.
In the 19th century the law of occupation started to develop. There were
some writers who paid attention to the subject of occupation, but numerous
scholars agree that the foundations for the international law of occupation
were laid by Dr. Francis Lieber.34
33 Graber 1968, p. 13; Von Glahn 1957, p. 7; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 1952, p. 432.
34 Von Glahn 1957, p. 8; Graber 1968, p. 6; Benvenisti 1993, p. 7 f.n. 3; Levie in Carey/Dunlap/
Pritchard 2003, p. 182.
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1.2 THE LIEBER CODE OF 1863
History and relevance
The document ‘Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States
in the Field’35 (hereinafter: the Lieber Code) was issued in 1863 to the Union
Forces in the American Civil War.36 It was prepared by the German-American
Professor Dr. Francis Lieber and revised by a board of military officers.37 Since
this document was issued by one country it was, of course, not binding on
other countries, but it served as an important source for subsequent military
manuals and international attempts to codify the law of occupation.38
The Lieber Code was a big development in the direction of contemporary
principles of occupation law, but not on all aspects of that law. In article 33
of the Lieber Code it is suggested that it is possible for the occupying power
to declare that the occupied territory becomes part of the sovereign territory
of the occupant.39 This phrasing suggests that occupation was accepted as
a legitimate way of gaining territory.40 As will become clear from the follow-
ing paragraphs, this contradicts the modern view on occupation.41
The conditions for ‘occupation’ according to the Lieber Code
Article 1 of the Lieber Code states that “the presence of the hostile army
proclaims its Martial law”.42 The concept of Martial law is explained in
Article 4 as “military authority exercised in accordance with the laws and
usages of war”.43 The same article states that Martial law is executed by
military force. This suggests that what amounts to occupation is the actual
physical presence of military forces on the territory. Only then is the Martial
law proclaimed, placing the territory under military authority.
1.3 THE BRUSSELS CODE OF 1874
History and relevance
The ‘Project of an international declaration concerning the laws and customs
of war’44 (hereinafter: the Brussels Code) is the first attempt on the inter-
national plane to codify the laws and usages of war. The document was drafted
35 Text reproduced in Schindler/Toman 2004, p.4.
36 Graber 1968, p. 14.
37 Schindler/Toman 2004, p.4.
38 Levie in Carey/Dunlap/Pritchard 2003, p. 182; Von Glahn 1957, p. 8.
39 Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 8.
40 Graber 1968, p. 40.
41 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 1952, p. 432.
42 Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 4.
43 Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 4.
44 Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 23.
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at the Brussels Conference of 1874, which was organized by Russia with the
purpose of drawing up a convention on the laws of war by European states.45
Delegates from 15 European countries attended the conference.46 17 Of the
65 articles in this final document deal with belligerent occupation.47
Based heavily on the Lieber Code, the Code was not intended to create
new laws, but to make a statement of what all states viewed as the existing
international law on the subject.48 However, the Brussels Code was never
ratified by the participating states.49 Nevertheless, the importance of this code
is obvious when one looks at the Hague Regulations: both conventions are
clearly based on the articles from the Brussels Code. The same goes for a large
number of military manuals in that time.50
The articles based on article 33 of the Lieber Code do not repeat the phrases
which suggest that sovereignty can be transferred to the occupant. Further-
more, according to article 2 of the Brussels Code, the authority of the legitimate
sovereign is only ‘suspended’.51 This suggests that it is no longer legitimate
for an occupant to place the occupied territory under its sovereignty.52
The conditions for occupation according to the Brussels Code
At the beginning of the debate on draft article 1, this article stated that territory
had to be in fact placed under military authority, and the occupation lasted
only as long as the military was in the position to exercise this authority.53
Effective control was seen as a basic requirement for occupation. All delegates
agreed that the power to suppress insurrection in the occupied territory was
necessary for effective control.54
The German delegate was of the opinion that it was not necessary to have
physical military presence in the territory for that territory to be effectively
occupied.55 The Swiss delegate believed that it was not necessary to have
a large military presence, although there should be some sign that the territory
is under the control of the occupant.56 The Dutch delegate found such a sym-
bolic presence not sufficient for occupation. According to him, the military
presence should always be able to enforce the occupation.57 A statement on
the duration of occupation was considered but not incorporated in the final
45 Graber 1968, p. 20.
46 Graber 1968, p. 21, 22.
47 Graber 1968, p. 24.
48 Graber 1968, p. 20, 24.
49 Von Glahn 1957, p. 8; Graber 1968, p. 26.
50 Von Glahn 1957, p. 8, 9; Graber 1968, p. 26.
51 Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 23.
52 Graber 1968, p. 47.
53 Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités 1879, p. 208; Graber 1968, p. 44.
54 Bordwell 1908, p. 106.
55 Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités 1879, p. 73.
56 Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités 1879, p. 74.
57 Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités 1879, p. 74.
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draft to prevent the suggestion that the physical presence of troops is essential
to occupation.58
Article 1 of the Brussels Code did not give a definitive statement on
whether physical occupation is necessary or when an occupation can be
considered effective.59 It only stated that territory can be considered occupied
when it is ‘actually placed’ under the authority of the occupant.60 The applica-
tion of the principle of effective control was left to the governments con-
cerned.61
1.4 THE OXFORD MANUAL OF 1880
History and relevance
‘The Laws of War on Land’ published by the Institute of International Law62
(hereinafter: the Oxford Manual) is a revision of the Brussels Code combined
with the views expressed in a number of national military handbooks of that
time.63 This resulted in a document which was written as a manual for sol-
diers and which attempted not to create new laws but to codify and specify
the existing laws. Its purpose was to make the laws of war more easily under-
standable and more commonly accepted.64 It was sent to a number of Euro-
pean governments with the intention to have those governments implement
the code into their military manuals, but there is little evidence that the Oxford
Manual was actually implemented by these governments.65 While the Oxford
Manual was not followed by official implementation or endorsement by states,
it is seen as a code of very high quality.66
The conditions for occupation according to the Oxford Manual
Article 41 of the Oxford Manual gives the definition of occupation. It states
that the invading state must alone be in a position to maintain order in the
occupied territory.67 This suggests that the occupant must have effective
control, as was discussed and defined at the Brussels Conference.68 It is not
made clear whether or not physical presence of troops is essential to occupa-
tion.
58 Graber 1968, p. 53.
59 Graber 1968, p. 45.
60 Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 23.
61 Bordwell 1908, p. 106.
62 Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 29.
63 Von Glahn 1957, p. 9.
64 Bordwell 1908, p. 113; Graber 1968, p. 28, 29.
65 Bordwell 1908, p. 113, 115; Graber 1968, p. 30.
66 Von Glahn 1957, p. 9; Bordwell 1908, p. 113.
67 Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 35.
68 See paragraph 1.3.
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Article 41 provides two more elements which are essential to occupation.
The first is that the occupation must be the consequence of invasion by hostile
forces. The second one is that the state to which the territory “belongs has
ceased, in fact, to exercise its ordinary authority therein”.69 Interesting to note
is that the phrasing of this article suggests that the authority only ceases in
fact, not in law. In other words, the sovereign authority over the territory is
not altered by the occupation. This confirms the views expressed in paragraph
1.3 of this essay.70
The last phrase of article 41 is the following: “The limits within which this
state of affairs exists determine the extent and duration of the occupation”.
This confirms that occupation only exists in the parts where the occupant is
the only power which exercises factual authority and has effective control.
69 Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 35.
70 See also Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 1952, p. 433.

2 The Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907
2.1 HISTORY OF THE HAGUE REGULATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907
In 1899, an international conference was organised in The Hague on initiative
of the Czar of Russia. Delegations of twenty-six states attended the Confer-
ence.1 One of its purposes was to revise the Brussels Code of 1874 in such
a way that it was acceptable to all states. This revision of the Brussels Code
was named the ‘Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land’ (hereinafter: the Hague Regulations 1899).2 The document was annexed
to the ‘Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land’
(hereinafter: the Hague Convention 1899),3 which resulted from the conference.
The Hague Regulations 1899 still closely resemble the Brussels Code. Thus,
the law of occupation has developed little in the 25 years between the drafting
of the two instruments.4
Ex article 1 Hague Convention 1899 the state parties were obliged to
instruct their armed forces in conformity with the Hague Regulations 1899.
Thus, the principles laid down in the Hague Regulations were of an obligatory
character, but states were not obliged to adopt the Hague Regulations 1899
word for word.5 Of the 26 participating states, 24 signed and ratified the
Hague Convention 1899. But only few of these states actually issued instruc-
tions in accordance with the Hague Regulations 1899 before the second confer-
ence of 1907.6 Article 43 of the Hague Regulations was then already accepted
as being part of customary international law and thus directly binding, since
it was considered a restatement of the law that was already codified in the
instruments discussed in chapter 1 of this essay.7
The 1907 Hague Convention
In 1907 another conference was held in The Hague. This conference was
attended by 44 states, representing almost the entire civilised world.8 Its
1 Graber 1968, p. 30; Bordwell 1908, p. 128, 129.
2 Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 66.
3 Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 60.
4 Graber 1968, p. 33; Von Glahn 1957, p. 9.
5 Bordwell 1908, p. 135, 136; Graber 1968, p. 32, 34.
6 Graber 1968, p. 33.
7 Benvenisti 2004, p. 8; Dinstein 1995, p. 2, 3; Von Glahn 1957, p. 11; Graber 1968, p. 143.
8 Bordwell 1908, p. 182; Graber 1968, p. 34.
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purpose was to discuss the Hague Regulations of 1899 in more detail and to
make amendments where necessary and possible.9 The provisions of the
Hague Regulations regarding occupation underwent only very small
changes.10 The document which resulted from this revision was again called
the ‘Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land’11
(hereinafter: the Hague Regulations) and was annexed to the ‘Convention (IV)
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land’ (hereinafter: the Hague
Convention 1907).12
2.2 STATUS OF THE HAGUE REGULATIONS
The Hague Regulations form the basis of most of the principles of the contem-
porary law of occupation,13 and are directly binding on state parties. This
is clearly illustrated by article 3, which provides for state responsibility and
liability as consequences of violation of the Hague Regulations.14
Moreover, the Hague Regulations are accepted as being part of customary
international law.15 This is confirmed in judgements of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal of Nuremberg16 and the International Court of Justice.17 It has
also been accepted as customary international law by the Israel High Court.18
Thus, the Hague Regulations are binding on all states as customary law,
whether they are party to the Hague Convention 1907 or not.19
2.3 OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE HAGUE REGULATIONS
At the time of drafting of the Hague Regulations, war was seen as only con-
cerning the armies and governments of the states involved in the conflict.
Civilians were kept out of the war.20 The individual was no more than an
object under international law and human rights were regarded as outside
the scope of international law.21 Governments were not yet involved in their
9 Bordwell 1908, p. 181, 182; Graber 1968, p. 34.
10 Bordwell 1908, p. 185; Von Glahn 1957, p. 9; Graber 1968, p. 34.
11 Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 66.
12 Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 60.
13 Benvenisti 2004, p. 9; Von Glahn 1957, p. 9.
14 Graber 1968, p. 34, 35.
15 Von Glahn 1957, p. 11; Gasser in Fleck 1995, p. 241; Kalshoven/Zegveld 2001, p. 38.
16 IMT Nuremberg Major War Criminals, p. 467.
17 ICJ Wall, para. 89; ICJ Nuclear Weapons, para. 75, 80, 81.
18 ISC H.C. 785/87 (Affo v IDF Commander), p. 163.
19 Pictet 1958, p. 614; Shaw 2003, p. 835; Dinstein 2004, p. 7; Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, p. 7.
20 Draper 1965, p. 119, 121; Benvenisti 2004, p. 27.
21 Shaw 2003, p. 45, 252.
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states’ economic and social life.22 The Preamble of the Hague Convention
1907, which puts the emphasis on the conduct between belligerents,23 warrants
the conclusion that the Hague Regulations were not drafted for the protection
of the human rights and the economic and social life of the population under
occupation.24 The main object and purpose of the Hague Regulations are the
regulation of conduct between the armed forces and the protection of state
interests.25
2.4 THE APPLICABILITY OF THE HAGUE REGULATIONS
The title of the Hague Regulations provides their applicability to war on
land.26 Article 2 of the Hague Convention 1907 provides that the Hague
Regulations are only applicable between Contracting Powers.27 This suggests
that the Hague Regulations are applicable in all cases where a formal state
of war exists, which is being fought on land between Contracting Powers.28
The distinction between Contracting and non-Contracting powers in Article
2 of the Hague Convention 1907 has lost its relevance, as the Hague Regula-
tions are binding on all states as customary international law.29
The necessity of a formal state of war, created by an official declaration
of war by the states concerned,30 flows from the fact that at the time of
drafting this was the only way to constitute a war in the legal sense.31 How-
ever, the interpretation of the concept of war has developed significantly, now
encompassing any international armed conflict.32 States have accordingly
interpreted the word ‘war’ in accordance with these developments in inter-
national law.33 This method of interpretation is endorsed by the ICJ in the
Namibia Advisory Opinion.34
22 Graber 1968, p. 35; Kalshoven/Zegveld 2001, p. 65; Benvenisti 2004, p. 27.
23 Preamble, Hague Convention 1907, in: Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 60, 61.
24 Greenwood in Kalshoven 2000, p. 217.
25 Pictet 1958, p. 614; Draper 1968, p. 122; Kalshoven/Zegveld 2001, p. 15; Benvenisti 2004,
p. 28, 29, 99, 110.
26 Title Hague Regulations, in Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 66.
27 Art. 2 Hague Convention 1907, in Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 62.
28 Greenwood in Kalshoven 2000, p. 192, 193; Kalshoven/Zegveld 2001, p. 38, 39.
29 Greenwood in Kalshoven 2000, p. 194; Kalshoven/Zegveld 2001, p. 38; see also para-
graph 2.2.
30 Von Glahn 1957, p. 20; Greenwood in Kalshoven 2000, p. 194.
31 Kalshoven/Zegveld 2001, p. 39.
32 Pictet 1958, p. 20; Greenwood in Kalshoven 2000, p. 193; Kalshoven/Zegveld 2001, p. 38, 39.
33 Greenwood in Kalshoven 2000, p. 193.
34 ICJ Namibia, para. 53; see also paragraph 2.5.2.
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2.5 THE BEGINNING OF OCCUPATION ACCORDING TO THE HAGUE REGULATIONS
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations determines when territory is considered
occupied. This definition was not altered in 1907 and is thus the same as in
the Hague Regulations 1899. The definition of occupation under the Hague
Regulations can also be considered the same as under the Brussels Code since
the formulation of the Brussels Code was adopted.35
Two elements of occupation can be derived from article 42 of the Hague
Regulations. These elements are (1) effective control over the territory and (2)
the establishment of a directly exercised authority.36
2.5.1 The establishment of a military authority
The latter element entails that the occupant is obliged to establish a direct
military authority.37 This can be concluded from the second part of article
42 and the title of Section III of the Hague Regulations: “Military Authority
over the territory of the hostile state”.38 This authority must be exercised direct-
ly39 and should have an open and identifiable command structure.40 How-
ever, it is not a basic condition; without such a military authority, occupation
can still exist.41 The purpose of this element is thus not to limit the applicabil-
ity of the provisions on occupation, but to facilitate the compliance with the
obligations of an occupant under the Hague Regulations.
2.5.2 Effective control
The first element is a basic condition for any occupation and entails that the
occupant must establish and continue to exercise effective control.42 This
expresses the factual character of occupation.43 Von Glahn suggests that effect-
ive control consists of two different elements: the control over a territory, and
35 Graber 1968, p. 61.
36 Art 42 Hague Regulations, in Schindler/Toman, p. 77, 78.
37 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 1952, p. 434; Von Glahn 1957, p. 28; Roberts 1985, p. 252; Green-
wood in Playfair 1992, p. 246; Bothe in Bernhardt 1997, p. 764; Benvenisti 2004, p. 4; Scobbie
in 11 YIMEL, p. 15.
38 Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 77; see also Roberts 1985, p. 251, 252.
39 Von Glahn 1957, p. 28; Bothe in Bernhardt 1997, p. 764; Benvenisti 2004, p. 4.
40 Roberts 1985, p. 252.
41 ICJ Congo v. Uganda, para. 173; ICJ Congo v. Uganda, Sep. Op. Kooijmans, para. 41; Oppen-
heim-Lauterpacht 1952, p. 434; Benvenisti 2004, p. 5; Gasser in Fleck 1995, p. 244; Cavanaugh
in Wippman/Evangelista 2005, p. 246; Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, p. 15.
42 Von Glahn 1957, p. 28; Gasser in Fleck 1995, p. 243; Bothe in Bernhardt 1997, p. 764;
Cavanaugh in Wippman/Evangelista 2005, p. 245.
43 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 1952, p. 435.
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the power to enforce this control when necessary. In the words of Von Glahn:
“as long as the territory as a whole is in the power and under the control of
the occupant and as long as the latter has the ability to make his will felt
everywhere in the territory within a reasonable time, military occupation exists
in a legal point of view”.44
The establishment and maintenance of effective control
The latter element of Von Glahn’s definition deals with the role of the military
in the establishment and the maintenance of effective control. Since the Hague
Regulations are part of jus in bello, physical presence of armed forces is con-
sidered necessary for the establishment of effective control.45 In this context,
supremacy in the air alone does not establish effective control.46 However,
once effective control is already established, air supremacy may be enough
to maintain it when this military element is available and sufficient to suppress
insurrection and enforce obedience.47 Such a military power over the occupied
territory is the minimum of what must be available.
This is consistent with the views expressed at the Brussels Conference in
1874,48 and is confirmed by the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.49 It implies
that physical presence of armed forces on the ground at all times is not a
prerequisite for maintaining effective control. That the military power is in
fact capable of enforcing the will of the occupant within a reasonable time
is sufficient.50 The difference between the amount of military power necessary
for the establishment of effective control on the one hand and the maintenance
of effective control on the other, flows logically from the fact that the forces
fighting against the occupant are significantly weaker once effective control
is established.51
The object of the effective control
Effective control is in its nature, as occupation itself, a factual question.52
However, the question remains what it is exactly that must be brought under
the effective control of the occupant and enforced by its military. What is the
object of effective control, placing a territory under occupation in the meaning
of Von Glahn’s definition?
44 Von Glahn 1957, p. 29.
45 Von Glahn 1957, p. 28; Roberts 1985, p. 251; Gasser in Fleck 1995, p. 243; HPCR Bruderlein
2004, p. 9.
46 Gasser in Fleck 1995, p. 243; HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 9.
47 Von Glahn 1957, p. 28; Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, p. 19.
48 See paragraph 1.3.
49 IMT Nuremberg Wilhelm List, p. 56; HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p.8.
50 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 1952, p. 435; HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 9; Cavanaugh in Wippman/
Evangelista 2005, p. 245; Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, p. 19.
51 See also Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, p.19.
52 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 1952, p. 435; Von Glahn 1957, p. 29; Gasser in Fleck 1995, p. 243;
Roberts 1985, p. 256; HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 8.
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In order to answer this question the relevant provisions of the Hague
Regulations need to be interpreted. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which reflects customary international law,53
prescribes that a treaty shall be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary
meaning of the text of the treaty provisions, seen in their context and in the
light of the object and purpose of the treaty.54 The primary method of inter-
pretation is interpreting treaty provisions in the ordinary meaning of their
text. The ICJ and the ILC confirmed that this method of interpretation, which
is also known as the objective or textual approach, should be seen as the
primary method of interpretation.55
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations states that what must pass into the
hands of the occupant is the authority of the legitimate power.56 This suggests
that the methods of exercising this authority, the government functions, have
to come under the effective control of the occupant. Or, as the ICJ has put it,
that the occupant must substitute its own authority for that of the legitimate
government.57
If one looks at the context of the provisions of the Hague Regulations, this
interpretation is confirmed.58 Other provisions all imply the exercising and
thus control over government functions, like territory administration (article
55), the maintenance of law and order (article 43) and the levying of taxes
(articles 48, 49 and 51).
The third element of the rule of interpretation of the VCLT is the object and
purpose of a treaty. This method of interpretation, which is based on a teleo-
logical approach, should not be given preference over the textual approach
and must not be relied on too much, but it is nevertheless an important aspect
in the interpretation of a treaty.59 The main purpose of article 42 at the time
of drafting was to protect the interests of the legitimate sovereign when another
state exercises authority on its territory.60 This suggests that it is not the con-
trol over the daily life of the civilians that is relevant for the establishment
of effective control, but the regulation of the exercise of the government
functions of the legitimate authority in its absence.61
53 ICJ Wall, para. 94; Cassese 2005, p. 179; Fitzmaurice in Evans 2006, p. 199.
54 art 31 VCLT, in Elementair Internationaal Recht 2001, p. 88.
55 Brownlie 2003, p. 602; Anton/Mathew/Morgan 2005, p. 304, 305; Fitzmaurice in Evans
2006, p. 199.
56 Art. 43 Hague Regulations, in Schindler/Toman, p. 78.
57 ICJ Congo v. Uganda, para. 173.
58 art 31 VCLT, in Elementair Internationaal Recht 2001, p. 88; Fitzmaurice in Evans 2006,
p. 199.
59 ICJ Namibia, para. 53; Brownlie 2003, p. 607; Cassese 2005, p. 179; Anton/Mathew/Morgan
2005, p. 304, 305; Fitzmaurice in Evans 2006, p. 199, 202.
60 See paragraph 2.3.
61 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 1952, p. 436; Greenwood in Kalshoven 2000, p. 217; see also
paragraph 2.3.
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What can be concluded from this interpretation is that for occupation to
exist under the Hague Regulations, the government functions of the legitimate
authority must be brought under the effective control of the occupant.62 This
is confirmed by the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.63
As will become clear in chapter 3, the concept of effective control is also
the key aspect of occupation in the meaning of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
the other treaty in which the law of occupation is laid down. As will be
discussed in chapter 3, the object of the effective control under the Fourth
Geneva Convention (hereinafter: GC IV-effective control) is wider than the object
of the effective control in the meaning of the Hague Regulations (hereinafter:
HR-effective control).64 As is stated by the ICJ in the Namibia Advisory Opinion,
the interpretation of a treaty provision cannot be unaffected by subsequent
developments in international law, and international instruments must be
interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system
prevailing at the time of the interpretation.65 So if the GC IV-effective control
could be considered as a development of the HR-effective control, the former
could replace the latter when applying the Hague Regulations.
The GC IV-effective control will be discussed extensively in paragraph 3.5
of this essay. There it will be made clear that the nature of GC IV-effective
control differs from that of HR-effective control in such a way that application
of the former to the Hague Regulations cannot be justified by interpretation.
The wider concept of GC IV-effective control is contrary to the text and context,
as well as the object and purpose of the Hague Regulations, and can therefore
not be seen as a development in the application of that treaty.
2.5.3 The government functions which have to be under effective control
The government functions which have to be under the effective control of the
occupant are not specified in doctrine. It flows from the factual character of
occupation that it is case-specific, depending for example on the way in which
the legitimate sovereign exercised its authority. It is clear that the management
of the internal and external security of the territory is one of the key functions
of a government, which is confirmed in the Hague Regulations.66 The control
over the international borders, which includes the control over import and
export of the territory as well as the movement of people across those borders,
is also a key function of a government.67 Further issues which can be identi-
62 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 1952, p. 435, 436; Benvenisti 2004, p. 181, 182.
63 IMT Nuremberg Wilhelm List, p. 55, 56; HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 9.
64 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 60; Roberts 1985, p. 253; see paragraphs 3.5, 3.5.2.
65 ICJ Namibia, para. 53; Cassese in Playfair 1992, p. 424.
66 HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 9; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 1952, p. 435, 437; Art. 43 Hague
Regulations, in Schindler/Toman, p. 78.
67 HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 9.
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fied as government functions are the passing of legislation, the maintenance
of basic utilities like postal services and sanitation, the development of the
political and economic system and the maintenance of the international contacts
of the territory.68
The functions above translate into effective control over the police force,
military and border patrol, customs, civil administration, the banking system
and so on. Government functions are not limited to the above mentioned
functions. Likewise, it is not necessary that the occupant controls all the above
mentioned government functions. It is neither necessary that the occupant
maintains control over all the government functions it had under effective
control at the start of the occupation, as long as the overall control can still
be considered effective. In most cases, the minimum of control necessary in
order to be effective, will be control over the government functions which are
necessary for the enforcement of the authority. This entails police and military,
but depending on the geography of the region could also entail border control.
This also provides the minimum of effective control necessary to comply with
the obligations of article 43 of the Hague Regulations.69
2.6 THE ENDING OF OCCUPATION ACCORDING TO THE HAGUE REGULATIONS
No article in the Hague Regulations specifically refers to conditions for the
ending of occupation. However, article 42 states that occupation only extends
to the territory where the control can be exercised.70 Thus, when the control
is no longer effective, the occupation has ended. The ending of occupation
is just like its establishment a question of fact.71 Oppenheim states that occu-
pation traditionally ends when an occupant withdraws from the territory or
is driven out of it.72 However, it can be assumed that the reason why control
ceases to be effective, whether it is the defeat of the occupant, withdrawal or
otherwise, is of no relevance.
68 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 1952, p. 435; HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 9.
69 Art. 43 Hague Regulations, in Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 78.
70 Art. 42 para. 2 Hague Regulations, in Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 78.
71 HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 10.
72 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 1952, p. 436.
3 The Fourth Geneva Convention 1949
3.1 HISTORY OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION
In February 1945 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) com-
menced with the preparatory work for the revision of the existing humanitarian
law instruments and the development of new rules in this area.1 The purpose
of the revision was to incorporate the experiences of the Second World War
into humanitarian law so as to prevent the atrocities of this war in the future.2
The preparatory work resulted in four Draft Conventions, which were used
as ‘working documents’ for the ‘Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment
of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of the War’, held
from April to August 1949.3 63 States were represented at the conference, while
61 of them signed all four of the new Geneva Conventions.4
One of those conventions is the ‘Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War’ (hereinafter: the Fourth
Geneva Convention). According to article 154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
it is supplementary to sections II and III of the Hague Regulations.5 Section III
of the Hague Regulations deals with occupation.6 The effect of this provision
on the convention will be discussed in paragraph 3.5 of this essay.
3.2 STATUS OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION
The Fourth Geneva Convention is ratified by 194 states, which makes it
universally accepted.7 Besides the fact that this makes it universally binding
as treaty law, this could be an indication that the Fourth Geneva Convention
as a whole is part of customary international law.8 The ICJ has stated in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Judgement that a conventional rule can become a
1 Pictet 1951, p. 464.
2 Gutteridge 1949, p. 295; Pictet 1951, p. 463, 473.
3 Gutteridge 1949, p. 295, 296; Pictet 1951, p. 467.
4 Gutteridge 1949, p. 294, 296; Pictet 1951, p. 468.
5 Art. 154 GC IV, in Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 613.
6 See paragraph 2.5.1.
7 Pellet in Playfair 1992, p. 189; Dinstein 2004, p. 11; ICRC State Parties List; ICRC Customary
IHL 2005, p. xliv; ICRC Press Release 21/08/2006.
8 Meron 1987, p. 366; ICRC Customary IHL 2005, p. xlii, xliii.
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rule of customary international law by a very widespread and representative
participation in the convention.9 Also, in theMilitary and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua Judgement, the ICJ saw the almost universal ratification
of the UN Charter and the acts of states in accordance with obligations under
the UN Charter as an important indication for constituting customary inter-
national law.10 In this judgement it is noted that such acts by states can be
seen separately from their treaty obligations.
On the other hand, the ICJ has stated in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Judgement that acts by states which are bound by a treaty are potentially acting
in the application of this treaty and therefore these acts cannot be seen as
evidence for the existence of a rule of customary international law.11 Thus,
wide accession to a treaty could create difficulties for the determination of
that treaty as customary international law, since actions and declarations of
state parties are to be seen as conforming to their treaty obligations instead
of forming the necessary state practice and opinio juris.12
The Report of the Secretary-General of the UN pursuant to paragraph 2
of Security Council resolution 808 (1993), which has been unanimously adopted
by the Security Council,13 states that it is beyond doubt that the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims have become
part of customary international law.14 Support can also be found in doctrine
for the view that the Fourth Geneva Convention as a whole is accepted as
being part of customary international law.15
The relevant paragraph of the report of the Secretary-General is also quoted
by the ICJ in its Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion.16 Although this
would suggest that the ICJ endorses the conclusion of the Secretary-General,
this is not supported by the subsequent text of the opinion. Instead, the ICJ
has stated in that same Advisory Opinion that the great majority of the rules
which are laid down in the Geneva Conventions “constitute intransgressible
principles of international customary law”.17 There can also be found support
in doctrine for this assessment of the status of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion.18
Since both the ICJ and the ICRC, in its authoritative study concerning cus-
tomary international humanitarian law, recently explicitly stated that merely
9 ICJ Continental Shelf cases, para. 73.
10 ICJ Nicaragua, para. 188; ICRC Customary IHL 2005, p. xliii.
11 ICJ Continental Shelf cases, para. 76.
12 Meron 1987, p. 365.
13 ICJ Nuclear Weapons, para. 81.
14 S-G Report 1993, para. 35.
15 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 9; Roberts in Playfair 1992, p. 35; Pellet in Playfair 1992, p 189;
Cavanaugh in Wippman/Evangelista 2005, p 231.
16 ICJ Nuclear Weapons, para. 81.
17 ICJ Nuclear Weapons, para. 79, 82.
18 Roberts, in Playfair 1992, p. 35; ICRC Customary IHL 2005, p. xxx, xliv.
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a great majority of the provisions in the Fourth Geneva Convention can be
regarded as customary international law, it cannot be held that the convention
as a whole constitutes customary international law.19
3.3 OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION
A good indication of the object and purpose of the convention can be found
in its title: ‘the protection of civilian persons in time of war’. However, the
convention is not so much concerned with the dangers to civilian persons of
the military operations themselves. Its main purpose is to protect civilians
against arbitrary action by the enemy.20 Unlike the Hague Regulations, it was
not drawn up to serve state interests.21 It is foremost a minimum and essential
set of rules for the protection of civilians, to which every human being is
entitled in the widest possible range of situations.22
3.4 THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION
While article 154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that the convention
is supplementary to parts of the Hague Regulations, the convention clearly
has its own rules of applicability.23 The main provision on applicability of
the Fourth Geneva Convention is article 2, which provides the situations in
which the convention as a whole is applicable. Article 6 paragraph 1 deter-
mines that the Convention as a whole is applicable from the outset of the
situations referred to in article 2. Another important article is article 4, which
determines the individuals who enjoy the protection of the provisions in the
convention, once the convention is applicable.24
3.4.1 Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
Of the two paragraphs on applicability in article 2 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, the first is the most important one. It states that the Convention
is applicable in all cases of armed conflict between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties.25 Although at first sight the second paragraph seems
to be the most interesting rule of applicability for this essay, since it explicitly
19 ICJ Nuclear Weapons, para. 79, 82; ICRC Customary IHL 2005, p. xxx, xliv.
20 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 10, 11; Benvenisti 2004, p. 110.
21 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 21, 614; Benvenisti 2004, p. 110.
22 ICJ Wall, para. 95; Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 9, 13, 14; Roberts 1985, p. 256.
23 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 617.
24 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 59.
25 Article 2 GC IV, in Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 17.
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mentions occupation, it is only meant for situations in which no armed conflict
has arisen. In cases of occupation during armed conflict, the applicability of
the Convention can already be based on the first paragraph.26 Therefore, when
the occupation occurs in armed conflict, it is not relevant whether the territory
under occupation belongs to one of the High Contracting Parties. A differing
view, as held by Israel, will be discussed more extensively in Part II of this
essay.27
The first condition for application is that there is an international armed
conflict. Conflicts not of an international character are dealt with in article
3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. A formal declaration of war or recognition
of the state of war is no longer necessary for this instrument of humanitarian
law to be applicable. In the spirit of this development, the definition of armed
conflict is not complex. Any dispute between states which involves armed
forces amounts to an armed conflict.28
The second condition is that the armed conflict must be between two High
Contracting Parties. All states are bound by the great majority of provisions
of the Fourth Geneva Convention since they form part of customary inter-
national law.29 Thus, with respect to the provisions which form part of cus-
tomary international law, the distinction between a High Contracting Party
and a state which is not a party to the convention in the sense of article 2 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention has lost its relevance.
It is important to note that when an occupation occurs during an armed
conflict to which the Fourth Geneva Convention applies, the convention is
applicable to the territory under occupation irrespective of the status of that
territory. In other words, the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable whether
the territory is part of one of the parties to the conflict or not.30 This is sup-
ported by the wording of article 4 and article 2. The view that the status of
the territory under occupation is of no relevance is further supported by the
1977 Geneva Protocol I, which is supplementary to the Geneva Conventions.
This document is discussed further in chapter 4.31
26 ICJ Wall, para. 95; Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 21; Roberts 1985, p. 253; Roberts in Playfair
1992, p. 47; Falk/Weston in Playfair 1992, p. 132; Benvenisti 2004, p. 110; Cavanaugh in
Wippman/Evangelista 2005, p. 241.
27 See paragraph 7.2.
28 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 20.
29 See paragraph 3.2.
30 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 22; Roberts in Playfair 1992, p. 47; Greenwood in Playfair 1992,
p. 243, 244; Benvenisti 2004, p. 110; Cavanaugh in Wippman/Evangelista 2005, p. 241, 242.
31 See paragraph 4.4.2.
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3.4.2 Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
Article 6 paragraph 1 determines that the Convention as a whole is applicable
from the outset of the situations referred to in article 2.32 This is an expression
of the view that the protection which the convention provides for civilians,
should be applicable from the moment that those civilians could be affected
by the consequences of armed conflict, irrespective of the duration or the size
of the armed conflict.33
3.4.3 Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
Article 4 defines the persons who are protected by the convention. These are
persons
“who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case
of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying
Power of which they are not nationals”.34
The words ‘in case of a conflict or occupation’ refer to article 2, which provides
the rules of applicability. This affirms the connection between the two
articles.35 Article 4 does not specify whether the person who is in the hands
of a party to the conflict must be on the territory of one of these parties. It
is sufficient that one of the parties actually has control over the person or
group of persons. This confirms the view that the status of territory is of no
relevance for the application of the convention.
The important question is when persons can be considered as being ‘in
the hands of a Party to the conflict’. The ICRC Commentary suggests that the
article was mainly intended for two categories: (1) persons of enemy nationality
living on the territory of a party to the conflict and (2) the inhabitants of
occupied territories.36 Nevertheless, the wording of the provision clearly is
not limited to those two categories. Accordingly, the ICRC Commentary explicit-
ly states that the words “at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever”37
are intended to ensure that all situations and cases, in which persons are in
the hands of a party to the conflict, are covered.38 This is in accordance with
32 Art 6 para. 1 GC IV, in Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 58.
33 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 59.
34 Art 4 paragraph 1 GC VI, in Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 45.
35 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 47.
36 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 45.
37 Art 4 paragraph 1 GC IV, in Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 45.
38 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 47.
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the object and purpose of the convention, which are to provide a minimum
amount of protection to the civilian population in a wide range of situations.39
Whether a person is in the hands of a party to the conflict is a question
of fact.40 It is not necessary to be under direct physical control of the party
to the conflict, as for example a person in detention is, to enjoy the protection
of the Fourth Geneva Convention.41
A party to the conflict must exercise control over the person, irrespective
of when and how this control was established.42 Bearing in mind this broad
wording of article 4, it is my view that such control is established when the
physical, economic and social wellbeing of an individual are in the hands of
a party to the conflict. This is what should be protected and is indeed what
the Fourth Geneva Convention aims to protect.43 The broad scope of this
article is endorsed by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY.44
It is logical that all civilians who find themselves in occupied territory are
considered to be Protected Persons in the meaning of this article.45 But it is
not clear how the definition of Protected Persons influences the definition of
occupation in the meaning of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This will be
discussed in paragraph 3.5.
3.5 THE BEGINNING OF OCCUPATION ACCORDING TO THE FOURTH GENEVA
CONVENTION
3.5.1 A new perspective in determining occupation
Article 154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that the convention is
supplementary to parts of the Hague Regulations, including article 42, which
is discussed in chapter 2. However, the definition of occupation as found in
article 42 of the Hague Regulations does not have a direct influence on the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention, or at least not as far as indi-
viduals are concerned.46 Instead, the rules of applicability of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, as elaborated on in the previous paragraph, provide when
the provisions in the Fourth Geneva Convention become fully applicable with
respect to civilians.47 Nevertheless, Section III of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
39 See paragraph 3.3.
40 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 47; Roberts 1985, p. 256; Benvenisti 2004, p. 160.
41 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 47.
42 Art 4 paragraph 1 GC VI, in Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 45.
43 See paragraph 3.3, 3.5.3.
44 ICTY Rajic´, para. 36.
45 Commentary Pictet, p. 47.
46 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 60, 617.
47 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 60; Dörmann/Colassis 2004, p. 299, 301, 304; ICRC Official
Statement 21/11/2005.
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tion explicitly refers to occupied territories. This suggests that the provisions
contained in that section only apply to territories under occupation.48 The
Fourth Geneva Convention itself does not contain a clear definition of when
territory becomes occupied.49 This lack of clarity on what forms the definition
of occupation under the Fourth Geneva Convention is discussed below.
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations as defining occupation
One approach in finding a definition of occupation for Section III of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, is to use article 42 of the Hague Regulations as providing
the applicability of section III. This view is expressed by the Trial Chamber
of the ICTY.50 It is also supported by some scholars.51 In my view however,
article 42 of the Hague Regulations, which entails that occupation only exists
when the government functions are under the effective control of the occupant,
would provide a too narrow scope of protection for civilians. To support this
view, I will use the rule of interpretation as is laid down in article 31 of the
VCLT, which is discussed in paragraph 2.5.2 of this essay.
The text of article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as discussed above,
provides the clearest evidence for this view. This article states that protection
to a person is granted once control over that person is established in any
manner whatsoever.52 This clearly encompasses more than effective control
of a party over the government functions of the legitimate authority. The
definition of occupation under the Fourth Geneva Convention, and more
specifically the object of the effective control of the occupant, must be con-
strued broader than that of the Hague Regulations.53
In the context of the Fourth Geneva Convention, this interpretation is
confirmed by article 47 of the convention. This article determines that persons
enjoy the protection they are entitled to under the convention, irrespective
of the mode of governance in the territory.54 The title and preamble of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, which are also part of the context of the conven-
tion,55 explicitly refer to the protection of civilians in time of war, which
confirms that the focus is primarily on the civilians instead of the protection
of the interests of the legitimate authority.56 This seems contrary to the narrow
scope of article 42 of the Hague Regulations.
48 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 272; Roberts 1985, p. 256; Zwanenburg 2004, p. 749; Dörmann/
Colassis 2004, p. 300.
49 Dörmann/Colassis 2004, p. 298.
50 ICTY Kordic´, para. 338, 339; ICTY Naletilic´ and Martinovic´, para. 216-218.
51 Gutteridge 1949, p. 299; Roberts 1985, p. 256; Gasser in Fleck 1995, p. 243.
52 Art 4 paragraph 1 GC VI, in Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 45; see also paragraph 3.4.3.
53 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 60; Roberts 1985, p. 253.
54 Art 47 GC IV, in Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 273.
55 Brownlie 2003, p. 605.
56 Title and Preamble GC IV, in Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 10, 11.
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Another indication for the view that the object of HR-effective control is
narrower than the object of GC IV-effective control can be found in article 6
paragraph 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This article suggests that a
territory can be occupied even if the Occupying power does not exercise
government functions.57
Lastly, the object and purpose of the Fourth Geneva Convention are not
in conformity with the narrow scope of the HR-effective control. As stated
above, the object and purpose are to create a minimum and essential set of
rules for the protection of civilians, to which every human being is entitled
in the widest possible range of situations.58 Limiting the scope of occupation
to situations in which the government functions are under the control of the
occupant will exclude a wide range of factual situations in which civilians
are in need of the protection provided for in the Fourth Geneva Convention,
while the situation does not yet amount to occupation.
The definition of Protected Persons as defining occupation
Another approach in finding a definition of occupation, is to view article 4
of the Fourth Geneva Convention as defining occupation from a different
viewpoint: not the effective control of a state over the territory and its author-
ity, but the broader effective control of a state over the civilian population
of a territory. Then, the rules concerning occupied territories become fully
applicable for a group of persons when it is placed under the effective control
of a party to the conflict.59 This view is supported by the ICRC, as well as the
Trial Chamber of the ICTY.60 However, this still would only concern indi-
viduals and does not extend to, for example, property under occupation.61
This leaves open the question when territory becomes occupied as a whole,
most likely leading to two different definitions of occupation under one
convention. This is unsupported by the convention itself, since, as mentioned
earlier, this does not take into account the difference between the articles
providing general protection, and Section III of the convention, which contains
rules applicable only to occupied territories.62
Evidently, there is a considerable gap between the two methods of deter-
mining occupation as described above. This becomes very obvious when one
looks at the inconsistencies in the decisions of the ICTY Trial Chamber, as well
57 Art 6 paragraph 3 GC VI, in Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 58; Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 62,
63; HPCR Policy Brief 2004, p. 7.
58 See paragraph 3.3.
59 See also paragraph 3.4.3.
60 ICTY Naletilic´ andMartinovic´, para. 221; Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 60; Dörmann/Colassis
2004, p. 299, 301, 304; ICRC Official Statement 21/11/2005.
61 ICTY Naletilic´ and Martinovic´, para. 222; but see ICTY Rajic´, para. 36-42 and ICTY Blac´kic´,
para. 150.
62 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 272; Roberts 1985, p. 256; Zwanenburg 2004, p. 749; Dörmann/
Colassis 2004, p. 300.
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as at the writings of scholars which do not provide a comprehensive definition.
The Fourth Geneva Convention itself does not provide clarity on which method
must prevail. In its judgements, the ICJ does not acknowledge any differing
definitions of occupation under the different instruments.63 Still, in my view
the definition of the Hague Regulations is too strict for the text and context,
as well as for the object and purpose of the Fourth Geneva Convention. On
the other hand, the conflation of the definition of Protected Persons and the
definition of occupation does not do justice to the title and wording of Sec-
tion III. For that same reason, the using of two different definitions of occupa-
tion under the Fourth Geneva Convention is questionable.
The solution to this problem could be found in the character of the law
of occupation. It is widely accepted that whether or not occupation exists must
be determined on a factual basis.64 Furthermore, it must be stressed that the
basic protection which the law of occupation intends to provide does not
benefit from a strict legalistic approach. Quite correctly, some scholars warn
not to make the law of occupation dependent on definitional wrangles and
legal niceties.65 As Roberts states, there are different types of occupation to
which the same law of occupation is applicable.66 In my opinion, this flexibil-
ity of the law of occupation warrants the use of the different interpretations
mentioned above together as indicators for control. This makes it possible to
determine the existence of occupation on a case-by-case basis, judged by the
scale of effectiveness of the control over the territory in a broad sense.
3.5.2 Effective control in the meaning of the Fourth Geneva Convention
This proposed concept needs clarification. The basis for the concept is that
sovereignty lies in the people.67 This sovereignty is what is subject to occupa-
tion. In this respect, the exercise of government functions are only expressions
of that sovereignty, not its source. Accordingly, the effective control over the
people and their territory can exist in more ways than just the control over
the government functions. Preventing the government functions to be effective-
ly exercised, without actually taking over the exercise of those government
functions, may create obligations under the law of occupation as the respon-
sibilities for those government functions are transferred to the occupant.
63 ICJ Wall, para. 90-101; ICJ Congo v. Uganda, para. 167-180.
64 ICTY Naletilic´ and Martinovic´, para. 211; Von Glahn 1957, p. 29; Roberts 1985, p. 256; Pellet
in Playfair 1992, p. 191; Gasser in Fleck 1995, p. 243; Zwanenburg 2004, p. 748; Dörmann/
Colassis 2004, p. 298.
65 Roberts 1985, p. 251, 256; Bothe in Bernhardt 1997, p. 764.
66 Roberts 1985, p. 260, 262.
67 Pellet in Playfair 1992, p. 174; Shaw 2003, p. 231; Benvenisti 2004, p. 29.
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Indicators for the existence of effective control
The people of a territory that are ‘in the hands of a party to the conflict’ can
be considered to be under occupation. The effective control over their physical,
economic and social wellbeing is a strong indicator that occupation exists,
especially when the legitimate authority hardly has any residual control over
the physical, economic and social wellbeing of its population. Of course, a
neighbouring state may often have influence on the economic and social
wellbeing of the civilians of another state. This influence can become quite
considerable when there is inequality between military and political power
of the two states. However, since the concept of occupation is part of the jus
in bello, it applies only in situations of armed conflict, in accordance with its
provisions of applicability. This provides for a different legal setting than the
coercion and influence between states in their regular interaction.
Also, an important indicator for the existence of occupation is whether
the party to the conflict has such control that it influences humanitarian
situations which the Fourth Geneva Convention is envisaged to protect. Such
possible situations are treatment of prisoners or the basic food supply. If the
influence is significant, the need for protection is obvious and the determina-
tion of the situation as occupation might be called for. This is further explained
in paragraph 5.3 of this chapter.
When aspects of the sovereignty of the people are under the control of
a party to the conflict, this is also a strong indication that occupation exists.
These aspects are largely similar to the government functions which have to
be under effective control in the meaning of the Hague Regulations, but are
supplemented with, for example, territorial integrity and the principle of non-
intervention. This will be illustrated in Part II of this essay, when dealing with
the control that Israel maintains in the Gaza Strip.68 As mentioned earlier,
it can also entail actions of the occupant rendering the exercising of govern-
ment functions by the legitimate authority ineffective.
The indicators discussed above combine HR-effective control with the
definition of Protected Persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention. When
the criteria for occupation under the Hague Regulations are met, it is obvious
that the control of the occupant also amounts to effective control under the
Fourth Geneva Convention. If the criteria under the Hague Regulations are
not completely met, the indicators discussed above could function as additional
methods in determining whether there is GC IV-effective control. Depending
on the factual situation, other indicators not discussed above could also play
a role in such a determination. Although the HR-effective control forms the
basis, it remains the overall balance, taking into account the factual situation
on the ground, which determines GC IV-effective control.
68 See chapter 8.
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The establishment and maintenance of effective control
As stated, the difference between the two concepts of effective control is in
the object of the established effective control and not in how it is established.
The military aspect in the establishment of GC VI-effective control is still of
paramount importance and what is remarked in paragraph 2.5.2 of this essay
is equally applicable. This flows from the rules of applicability laid down in
article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which determines that there must
be an armed conflict for the convention to apply. Thus, physical presence of
armed forces is considered necessary for the establishment of effective con-
trol.69 This makes the indicators mentioned above not so much soft criteria
for determining influence, but more a finding of consequences of military
action.
It flows from the factual criteria for occupation that it is not necessary that
GC IV-effective control is actively maintained by the military.70 However, it
is most likely that military actions function as an instrument of maintenance
of the effective control. It is certain that physical presence of armed forces on
the ground at all times is not a prerequisite for maintaining effective control.
That the military power is in fact capable of enforcing the will of the occupant
is sufficient.71 What is remarked in paragraph 2.5.2 of this essay about the
difference between the amount of military power necessary for the establish-
ment of effective control on the one hand and the maintenance of effective
control on the other, remains equally applicable.
3.5.3 Obligations and responsibilities of the occupant under the Fourth
Geneva Convention
Under the Fourth Geneva Convention an array of obligations and responsibil-
ities are imposed on the occupant. This raises the question whether the pro-
posed concept of GC IV-effective control creates occupants which are not able
to take on these obligations and responsibilities. As Gasser states, an occupant
must be able to actually assume the responsibilities which attach to an occupy-
ing power.72 Therefore I will briefly discuss the obligations for an occupant
in the light of the proposed definition of GC IV-effective control.
As stated, the physical, economic and social wellbeing of the civilian
population is what the Fourth Geneva Convention aims to protect. This is
evident in for example article 50, which creates the obligation for an occupant
to facilitate the care and education of children.73 The same goes for article
69 Von Glahn 1957, p. 28; Roberts 1985, p. 251; Gasser in Fleck 1995, p. 243.
70 Pellet in Playfair 1992, p. 191.
71 Cavanaugh in Wippman/Evangelista 2005, p. 245.
72 Gasser in Fleck 1995, p. 243.
73 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 284, 286.
36 The Fourth Geneva Convention 1949
55, which obligates the occupant to facilitate food and medical supplies, and
article 56, which is aimed to maintain hygiene and public health.74 Article
59 imposes the obligation to agree to relief schemes. All these articles impose
obligations on the occupant. And without a doubt these obligations entail a
considerable effort for any occupant.75 But what these articles aim to protect
is for a very important part what needs to be under the effective control before
occupation exists under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Thus it is not only
a big effort, it is the basic responsibility of every occupant.
In this respect, the obligations mentioned above can be used as a guideline
in determining whether there is GC IV-effective control. If a state has the
influence which is presupposed by these articles, and the other rules of applic-
ability are fulfilled, effective control may well exist, making the occupant fully
bound by the Fourth Geneva Convention. This flows logically from the point
of view that control comes with responsibility and the need for protection.
Other provisions containing obligations, such as the articles on penal
legislation, provide a scheme of protection, which only comes into force in
the cases that an occupant enacts penal legislation. It is likely that it does,
especially if it controls the government functions of a state, but these provisions
cannot be interpreted as demanding that every occupant must actually have
the power to do so. This is confirmed by section IV concerning the treatment
of internees. This very elaborate section must be seen as providing the funda-
mental rights and basic necessities for internees. Once a state interns persons
of another party in the course of an armed conflict, this section starts to apply.
However, this does not presuppose that every occupant interns protected
persons, or must do so before it becomes an occupant.
The last section that imposes obligations on the occupant is Section V,
concerning the Information Bureaux. However, this section is already applic-
able upon the outbreak of a conflict.76 Accordingly, such Bureaux should
already be in place irrespective of territory becoming occupied.77
In conclusion, no articles in the Fourth Geneva Convention are contrary
to the broad scope of occupation as discussed in this paragraph. On the con-
trary, the obligations which are imposed on the occupant are additional basis
for the proposed concept of GC IV-effective control.
In my opinion, it is now also obvious that the wider concept of GC IV-
effective control is contrary to the text, context and object and purpose of the
Hague Regulations and can therefore not be seen as a development in the
application of that treaty.78
74 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 309, 314.
75 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 309, 310, 313.
76 Art. 136 GC IV, in Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 523.
77 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 523.
78 See paragraph 2.5.2.
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3.6 THE ENDING OF OCCUPATION
Just like the beginning of occupation is a question of fact, the ending must
be judged on the same factual criteria. However, as was discussed in the
previous paragraph, the factual criteria with respect to military presence that
are necessary to establish effective control are stricter than the criteria by which
the maintenance of the effective control must be judged. Furthermore, as will
be discussed in the next paragraph, the application of part of the provisions
of the Fourth Geneva Convention to occupied territory is made dependable
of the elapsing of time.
3.7 ARTICLE 6 PARAGRAPH 3; THE ‘ONE YEAR AFTER-RULE’
Special reference must be made to article 6 paragraph 3 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention. This paragraph determines that the convention ceases to be
applicable in occupied territory, one year after the general close of military
operations. Only if the Occupying power exercises government functions in
the occupied territory, a ‘hard core’ of provisions of the convention remain
applicable.79 The provisions that remain applicable in such instances provide
for the basic rights of persons in occupied territory.80
As noted in paragraph 3.5.1 of this essay, the wording of this article sug-
gests that the situation might still constitute occupation in the meaning of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, but the selected provisions of the convention only
remain applicable to the occupied territory when the occupant exercises
government functions. Thus, one year after the general close of military oper-
ations, the applicability of the selected provisions no longer depends on
whether the occupant has GC IV-effective control, but rather on whether the
occupant has HR-effective control.81
Article 6 paragraph 3 was drafted with some occupations of that time in
mind: the occupation of Germany and of Japan, following World War II. This
partly explains the apparent illogical connection between protection of civilians
and the elapsing of time.82 The provision is subject of much debate and
attempts have been made to remove this provision from the law of occupa-
tion.83 However, in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the OPT, the ICJ still applied article 6 paragraph 3, when
79 Art. 6 para. 3 GC IV, in Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 58, 59; Roberts in Playfair 1992, p. 38;
Gasser in Fleck 1995, p. 251.
80 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 63; Roberts in Playfair 1992, p. 37; Gasser in Fleck 1995, p. 251.
81 See paragraph 2.5.2.
82 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 62, 63.
83 See paragraph 4.3.2.
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it dealt with the question of which provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention
are applicable to the situation in the West Bank.84
84 ICJ Wall, para. 125.
4 The Geneva Protocol I of 1977
4.1 HISTORY OF PROTOCOL I
In the wake of the 4 Geneva Conventions of 1949, the ICRC organized two
conferences of government experts, with the purpose of furthering the pro-
tection of civilians against the effects of armed conflict. The two draft protocols
which resulted from these conferences were used as basic documents at the
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. It was convened by the
depositary of the Geneva Conventions, Switzerland, and was held in four
sessions from 1974 to 1977. This conference, which was attended by delegates
from up to 124 states, resulted in the adoption of the two Additional Protocols
to the Geneva Conventions on 8 June 1977.1
One of those two protocols is the ‘Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)’ (hereinafter: Protocol I).
4.2 STATUS OF PROTOCOL I
Protocol I does not enjoy the universal acceptance of the Geneva Conventions,
although with 166 state parties it is very widely accepted.2 However, Protocol I
is not binding on Israel as treaty law, since Israel has not ratified it.3
It has not been convincingly argued that Protocol I as a whole is part of
customary law. However, it is argued that most provisions of Protocol I are
part of customary international law.4 Provisions which are relevant to the
law of occupation, for example, contain principles that have been codified
earlier and must be seen as reflecting customary law. These principles will
be discussed in paragraph 4.4.2 of this essay.
1 Sandoz/Swinarski/Zimmerman 1987, p. xxxi-xxxiii; Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 699.
2 ICRC Press Release 21/08/2006; ICRC State Parties List.
3 ICRC State Parties List.
4 Roberts in Playfair 1992, p. 36; Kalshoven/Zegveld 2001, p. 83; Dinstein 2004, p. 11.
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4.3 APPLICABILITY OF PROTOCOL I
Two articles are relevant to the applicability of Protocol I. Firstly article 1,
which provides for the situations to which Protocol I is applicable. Secondly
article 3, which determines the beginning and end of applicability.
4.3.1 Article 1
Article 1 paragraph 3 of Protocol I states that the protocol is applicable in the
situations referred to in article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.5
Thus, the terms for applicability are the same as for the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention.6
However, article 1 paragraph 4 provides for an important additional factor
in the applicability of Protocol I. Here it is stated that
“the situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination”.7
The wording of paragraph 4 suggests that it is only an explanatory paragraph,
clarifying the situations to which article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
is applicable.8 This is not supported by the drafting history of the Fourth
Geneva Convention.9 After heavy debate, article 3 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention was accepted. This article specifically deals with non-international
armed conflicts and provides a protection that is far less extensive than for
international armed conflicts.10 At the time of drafting, wars of national libera-
tion were seen as non-international conflicts.
Article 1 para. 4 of Protocol I intends to bring wars of national liberation
under the notion of international armed conflict.11 The debate on this para-
graph focussed on whether wars of national liberation now constitute inter-
national armed conflicts as a consequence of the development of international
law.12 If this is the case, article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention should
5 Art. 1 para. 3 Protocol I, in Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 715.
6 Bothe/Partsch/Solf 1982, p. 45; Sandoz/Swinarski/Zimmerman 1987, p. 39; see also
paragraph 3.4.
7 Article 1 para. 4 Protocol I, in Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 715.
8 Bothe/Patsch/Solf 1982, p. 38.
9 Pictet 1958, p. 30-33; Bothe/Partsch/Solf 1982, p. 39; Sandoz/Swinarski/Zimmerman 1987,
p. 39, 41, 46.
10 Art. 3 GC IV, in Pictet 1958, p. 25.
11 Detter 2000, p. 51; Kalshoven/Zegveld 2001, p. 85.
12 Bothe/Partsch/Solf 1982, p. 40, 45; Sandoz/Swinarski/Zimmerman 1987, p. 47, 49; Gasser
in Meyer 1989, p. 94, 95.
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be interpreted accordingly.13 This question is not free of controversy and it
is not necessary to resolve it for the purpose of this essay. As will become clear,
the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Palestinian
Territories does not depend on the answer to this question. It is noteworthy
that article 1 paragraph 4 is one of the main reasons why Israel and the United
States of America have not ratified Protocol I.14
4.3.2 Article 3
Article 3 of Protocol I deals with the beginning and end of application of
Protocol I and the Fourth Geneva Convention. Paragraph (a) of this article,
which is based on article 6 para. 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, states
that the conventions and the protocol apply from the beginning of any situation
referred to in article 1.15 For state parties to Protocol I the provisions in the
Fourth Geneva Convention on beginning and end of applicability are replaced
by article 3. This implies that article 1 para. 4 also deals with the applicability
of the Fourth Geneva Convention, but only for parties bound by the proto-
col.16
Paragraph (b) of article 3 provides rules governing the end of application
of the two instruments. For occupied territories it is determined that the
conventions and the protocol only cease to apply when the occupation is
terminated. This abrogates the ‘one year after’-rule of article 6 Fourth Geneva
Convention and renders the difficult factual test of this article, the ‘general
close of military operations’, without meaning for the applicability of the law
of occupation. However, since article 3 only replaces article 6 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention for parties bound by the protocol, a discrepancy exists
between the rules of applicability for both instruments. As is stated in para-
graph 4.2 of this essay, Israel is not bound by Protocol I. Article 3 paragraph
(b) shows the intention of the majority of states to change the ‘one year after’-
rule, making the applicability of the whole body of occupation law solely
dependent on the factual criteria for occupation. This view is supported by
doctrine.17 However, it cannot be maintained that this new rule applies to
other states than those party to Protocol I, since it lacks customary character.18
13 Sandoz/Swinarski/Zimmerman 1987, p. 51.
14 Aldrich 1991, p. 4-7; Meron 1994, p. 678, 682, 683.
15 Art. 3 para. (a) Protocol I, in Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 716.
16 Bothe/Partsch/Solf 1982, p. 57; Sandoz/Swinarski/Zimmerman 1987, p. 66, 67; Kalshoven/
Zegveld 2001, p. 86.
17 Bothe/Partsch/Solf 1982, p. 59; Sandoz/Swinarski/Zimmerman 1987, p. 68; Roberts in
Playfair 1992, p. 38, 39; Bothe in Bernhardt 1997, p. 764.
18 Roberts in Playfair 1992, p. 38; Gasser in Fleck 1995, p. 251, 252; Kalshoven/Zegveld 2001,
p. 86.
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This is confirmed by the recent application of article 6 paragraph 3 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention by the ICJ.19
4.4 PROVISIONS RELEVANT TO THE LAW OF OCCUPATION IN PROTOCOL I
There are no clarifications of key concepts like effective control in Protocol
I. However, the following provisions contain principles which are relevant
to the law of occupation.
4.4.1 Preamble
The preamble of the protocol states that:
“(…) the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of this
Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected
by those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin
of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the parties to
the conflict”.20
It states that jus ad bellum cannot affect jus in bello. In other words, this re-
affirms the principle of equal application of the laws of war to all parties to
the conflict, without prejudice to the political and legal background to the
conflict.21 Thus, it confirms that the application of humanitarian law is neutral,
providing protection to those who need it. This is in conformity with the
Fourth Geneva Convention and can thus be considered as a principle of
customary law.22 Its relevance to the humanitarian law in general is clear
and is the same as for the law occupation; whether the occupation of territory
was out of self-defence or otherwise legitimate under international law, or
that it is the result of an unlawful use of force, the laws of occupation apply
in full.
4.4.2 Article 4
Article 4 of Protocol I is of high importance since it contains important prin-
ciples on the legal status of parties to the conflict, territories and persons
19 ICJ Wall, para. 125.
20 Preamble Protocol I, in Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 715.
21 Bothe/Partsch/Solf 1982, p. 33; Sandoz/Swinarski/Zimmerman 1987, p. 28, 29; Greenwood
in Kalshoven 2000, p. 178; Benvenisti 2004, p. 190.
22 Pictet 1958, p. 44; See paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3.
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involved. On close reading it can be seen that article 4 contains three different
rules:23
1. the application of the conventions and protocol does not affect the legal
status of the parties to the conflict;
2. the application of the conventions and protocol do not affect the legal status
of the territory to which it is applied;
3. the occupation of territory does not affect the legal status of that territory.
The third rule is an important principle of international humanitarian law
already seen in the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention.
It reaffirms that annexation of an occupied territory is not recognized under
international law, and neither is any other change in the governance or the
status of the territory.24 However, it does not have any bearing on the applic-
ability of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I, since it does not
directly deal with the protection of civilians. It merely reiterates the temporary
character of occupation. Already under the Fourth Geneva Convention it is
stated that the changes mentioned above do not have any influence on the
protection of civilians.25
Rules 1 and 2 are exemplary of the object and purpose of the Fourth
Geneva Convention and Protocol I. These instruments do not intend to define
the relationship between the parties in the armed conflict, but only intend to
provide protection to the civilians involved in the armed conflict.26 According-
ly, these instruments do not intend to make a legal determination on the status
of (occupied) territory or on the persons the convention and protocol are
applied to. Thus, its mere application cannot entail a change in legal status.
Rules 1 and 2 ensure that political motives, such as the fear that a third party
may implicitly recognize political claims of one party to the conflict, can lead
to denying a person the basic humanitarian protection he or she is entitled
to under international law.27 This principle can also be found in article 3 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention. While this article only deals with non-inter-
national armed conflicts, it is a basic principle in the application to all armed
conflicts and is of customary character.28 It is also repeated in article 5 para-
graph 5 of Protocol I.29
Article 4 provides the basis of international humanitarian law in that
everybody is entitled to the same protection. Technically speaking however,
23 Art. 4 Protocol I, in Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 716.
24 Bothe/Partsch/Solf 1982, p. 62; Sandoz/Swinarski/Zimmerman 1987, p. 73, 74.
25 Art. 47 GC IV, in Pictet 1958, p. 273; Sandoz/Swinarski/Zimmerman 1987, p. 74; see para-
graph 3.5.1.
26 See paragraph 3.3.
27 See Pictet 1958, p. 44 on the comparable article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention..
28 Pictet 1958, p. 44; Bothe/Partsch/Solf 1982, p. 61; Sandoz/Swinarski/Zimmerman 1987,
p. 73.
29 Art. 5 para. 5 Protocol I, in Schindler/Toman 2004, p. 717.
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the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention to an occupied territory does
influence the legal status of the party exercising effective control over the
territory; it creates for this party the legal status of occupant.30
30 Bothe/Partsch/Solf 1982, p. 62.
5 Recent occupations and their consequences
for the law of occupation
In recent time, the international community has been confronted with several
occupations. The situations in which these occupations have occurred were
very diverse and generated numerous reactions from the international com-
munity. It falls outside the scope of this essay to discuss the differences and
similarities of these occupations in general. Therefore only two occupations
relevant to this essay will be briefly discussed.
5.1 THE WESTERN SAHARA
The occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco in 1976 was preceded by an
Advisory Opinion of the ICJ, in which the right of self-determination of the
people of the Western Sahara, then a Spanish colony, was confirmed.1 The
decolonisation process which followed the judgement was effectively hampered
by Morocco and Mauritania. Both states occupied considerable parts of the
Western Sahara territory when Spain withdrew as the colonial power. After
the withdrawal of Mauritanian forces from their part in 1979, Morocco moved
in and occupied the rest of the Western Sahara. An administration was set
up and a vast amount of Moroccan armed forces remain present in the
occupied territory. Morocco eventually claimed to have annexed the territory,
making it a province of Morocco.2
Since Morocco has set up an administration and maintained a large amount
of military forces present, there clearly was HR-effective control.3 Since the
criteria for occupation to exist in the meaning of the Hague Regulations are
met, the situation also constitutes occupation in the meaning of the Fourth
Geneva Convention.4 Only the question whether the situation qualifies as an
international armed conflict provides for some difficulty. The international
community has proclaimed the situation to constitute occupation on several
occasions.5 In 1979, the UN General Assembly stated that Morocco’s presence
1 ICJ Western Sahara, para. 162.
2 Franck 1976, p. 712, 715; Benvenisti 2004, p. 151, 152.
3 See paragraph 2.5.2.
4 See paragraph 3.5.2.
5 Benvenisti 2004, p. 152, 153.
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in the Western Sahara constituted occupation.6 Apparently, the armed conflict
between the national liberation movement of the Western Sahara, the POLISARIO,
and Morocco was deemed sufficient to constitute occupation. This is in line
with the view that the sovereignty lies in the people, whether this is the people
of an established sovereign state or a people of which the right of self-deter-
mination is recognized. It is also in conformity with Protocol I, albeit Morocco
was not and to this date is not a party to that document. Until 1980, neither
was Mauritania.7
5.2 OCCUPATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY; IRAQ AFTER
SADDAM HUSSEIN
On 20 March 2003 air strikes on Iraq commenced, carried out by a coalition
of states led by the United States of America (US) and the United Kingdom
(UK). These air strikes, which were followed by military actions on the ground,
constituted an international armed conflict.8 After the defeat of the armed
forces of Iraq, the US, UK and their coalition became the de facto authority in
Iraq, and created an administration.9 This administration, which is called the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), is intended to act as a government for
Iraq, vested with executive, legislative and judicial authority.10 This effective
control in an international armed conflict over the territory of Iraq is un-
doubtedly enough to constitute occupation.11 This is confirmed by the UN
Security Council.12
The most important question in this occupation is not its existence, but
its ending. According to the Security Council, the occupation of Iraq ended
on the 30th of June 2004 because of the reassertion of full authority and sover-
eignty by the newly formed Interim Government of Iraq.13 The real reassertion
took place on 28 June 2004. But it is far from obvious that this was the real
ending of occupation. Is the declared ending of occupation by the Security
Council in conformity with the law of occupation and the proposed concept
for the determination of effective control in the meaning of the Fourth Geneva
Convention?
First of all, it must be understood that the determination of the Security
Council is not a factual determination based on the situation on the ground.
6 UNGA Res 34/37.
7 ICRC State Parties List.
8 Zwanenburg 2004, p. 745, 747; Dörmann/Colassis 2004, p. 295.
9 Zwanenburg 2004, p. 747; Dörmann/Colassis 2004, p. 297.
10 CPA Order No. 1, Section 1.
11 HPCR Roberts 2004, p. 4; Zwanenburg 2004, p. 748; Dörmann/Colassis 2004, p. 302; Walker
in Wippman/Evangelista 2005, p. 260.
12 UNSC Res 1483 (2003), Preamble p. 2.
13 UNSC Res 1546 (8 June 2004), Preamble and para. 2.
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How could it be, given the fact that the Resolution of the Security Council
mentioned above was issued 3 weeks before the date of envisaged ending of
the occupation? It is more a political statement, anticipating on a future situ-
ation and based on the narrow definition of occupation in the meaning of the
Hague Regulations. If full sovereignty can once again be exercised by the
legitimate authority in Iraq, occupation will have ended. However, whether
this is the case remains a factual determination, not influenced by the exchange
of documents but by the factual transfer of power. At the time of drafting of
the Security Council resolution, it was the intention of the CPA to dissolve itself
and transfer its powers to the Interim Government.14 But at that point in time
it remained to be seen whether this ‘transfer’ would indeed have that effect,
or that the ‘transfer’ would just be a political act, in no way diminishing the
effective control of the occupying power. Thus, the resolution of the Security
Council is hard to reconcile with the Hague Regulations. It must also be
stressed that the resolution of the Security Council, as proof of recognition
by the international community, is only an indicator that the occupation has
ended. It is not a final legal determination.15
To make this determination, the factual situation as of 28 June 2004 must
be assessed. Are the changes that have taken place enough to end the occupa-
tion under the Hague Regulations as well as under the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion? As this is a complex legal issue, the interesting facets of this issue will
only be briefly discussed. Overall, what is most important is to note the
intertwinement of the aspects of occupation under the Hague Regulations and
the Fourth Geneva Convention.
The US and the CPA stated numerous times that after 28 June 2004 the
Interim Government would posses full sovereignty over Iraq. In this context
there was spoken of a ‘transfer of sovereignty’, but this wording is incorrect.
Occupation does not transfer sovereignty to the occupant, so the latter cannot
transfer it back; it remains vested in the people of Iraq. What is meant, is the
transfer of authority, or the control of the state institutions.16 It seems that
this control over the government functions was effectively transferred to the
Interim Government on the 28th of June 2004.17 Thus, at least occupation in
the meaning of the Hague Regulations seems to have ended.
One of the reasons for this assumption is that the Interim Government has
the authority to request the coalition forces to leave.18 By not making that
choice it seemingly legitimates the continued presence of the coalition forces.
14 HPCR Roberts 2004, p. 10, 11; Walker in Wippman/Evangelista 2005, p. 266.
15 HPCR Roberts 2004, p. 15, 16; Zwanenburg 2004, p. 753; Dörmann/Colassis 2004, p. 311;
Walker in Wippman/Evangelista 2005, p. 284.
16 HPCR Roberts 2004, p. 13.
17 HPCR Roberts 2004, p. 11; Zwanenburg 2004, p. 753; Walker in Wippman/Evangelista 2005,
p. 266.
18 HPCR Roberts 2004, p. 15; Dörmann/Colassis 2004, p. 311; Walker in Wippman/Evangelista
2005, p. 284.
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But as a result of the continued presence, the coalition forces in Iraq continue
to have considerable influence on the physical, economic and social wellbeing
of the civilian population.19 This is a proposed indicator for effective control
in the meaning of the Fourth Geneva Convention.20
Furthermore, according to article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
the civilian population is entitled to protection, no matter what form of admin-
istration is established in the territory. While this article primarily seeks to
prevent that occupants evade their responsibilities by installing puppet regimes,
it also aims to protect legitimate authorities against a foreign power imposing
its will through this authority. The fact remains that the amount of actual
control of a party to the conflict, over the civilian population or in this case
the authority in place, determines whether or not a territory is occupied.21
The intention of the coalition forces seems to be to promote the best inter-
ests of the civilian population, so the political will to move the situation outside
the law of occupation is understandable. One must not forget the negative
image that comes with the term occupation.22 However, the continued
presence of coalition forces, their considerable influence on the political process
and their considerable influence on the physical, social and economic wellbeing
of the civilian population are all arguments which indicate that occupation
in the meaning of the Fourth Geneva Convention might not have ended. This
uncertainty is also evident in the writings of scholars on this subject.23 Some
scholars state that the law of occupation under the Fourth Geneva Convention
should ‘at least’ be used as ‘guidance or minimum standards’.24 This is further
evidence that it is considered necessary that the minimum standards of the
law of occupation are applicable in a wide range of situations.
19 HPCR Roberts 2004, p. 14; Dörmann/Colassis 2004, p. 311; Walker in Wippman/Evangelista
2005, p. 259, 285.
20 See paragraph 3.5.2.
21 Dörmann/Colassis 2004, p. 309, 310.
22 HPCR Roberts 2004, p. 5; Walker in Wippman/Evangelista 2005, p. 260.
23 HPCR Roberts 2004, p. 18, 19; Dörmann/Colassis 2004, p. 312, 313; Walker in Wippman/
Evangelista 2005, p. 283.
24 Dörmann/Colassis 2004, p. 314.
6 Conclusion: what constitutes occupation
under the contemporary law of occupation?
6.1 COMMON PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF OCCUPATION
There is a solid body of common principles which have been developed
through time to form the basis of the law of occupation, whether it is laid
down in customary international law, the Hague Regulations or in the Fourth
Geneva Convention. These principles will be discussed in this paragraph.
Occupation does not transfer sovereignty
Although the effective control over the territory is in the hands of the occupant,
sovereignty remains with the legitimate power. But occupation can exist
regardless of whether there was a sovereign power prior to the occupation.
This principle therefore does not create a separate condition for occupation.1
Occupation is not a legitimate way of acquiring territory
Based on the principle that occupation does not entail a transfer of sovereignty,
it is clear that occupation has long since been abandoned as a legitimate way
to acquire territory. This is in conformity with the customary rule of inter-
national law that states that acquiring territory with the use of force is ille-
gitimate.2
Occupation does not influence the legal status of the territory and the parties
The legal status of a territory is not altered when the territory becomes
occupied. This ensures that the status of occupation is accepted by parties even
if one party does not recognize another party’s claims regarding the territory.
Occupation also does not influence the legal status of the parties involved in
the occupation. These principles are of paramount importance to the applica-
tion of the law of occupation in practice.3
Occupation is a factual situation, not a legal fiction
Occupation is a factual situation. Therefore, whether a situation constitutes
occupation must be assessed on the basis of factual criteria. For example,
occupation cannot be created by a declaration alone. In the same respect,
1 Paragraph 1.3; paragraph 1.4.
2 Paragraph 1.3; paragraph 1.4.
3 Paragraph 3.4.1; paragraph 3.4.2; paragraph 4.4.2.
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occupation can exist even if both parties refuse to accept it. Flowing from this
factual character, occupation only extends to that part of the territory that is
effectively occupied. It does not extend to the rest of the territory which is
part of the (sovereign) territorial unit.4
6.2 COMMON CONDITIONS FOR APPLICABILITY OF THE LAW OF OCCUPATION
The law of occupation is part of the jus in bello. This provides for some com-
mon conditions for applicability, as well as some rules of applicability which
are specific to the Hague Regulations or the Fourth Geneva Convention. The
common rules of application are the following.
The occupation must occur in the context of an international armed conflict
For both the applicability of the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva
Convention the existence of an international armed conflict is required.
Whether this armed conflict follows from violations of the jus ad bellum is
irrelevant. For states who are party to Protocol I, the scope of armed conflicts
to which the law of occupation applies, is wider.5
The parties to the international armed conflict must be bound by the instruments
in which the law of occupation is laid down
The instruments in which the law of occupation is laid down are the Hague
Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Hague Regulations are
binding on all states since they form part of customary international law. A
large part of the provisions in the Fourth Geneva Convention also forms part
of customary international law. In addition to that, the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion is binding on all states as treaty law.6
The status of the territory prior to the occupation is irrelevant to the applicability
Occupation can occur when there exists an international armed conflict. For
occupation it is irrelevant what the status of the territory was prior to it
becoming occupied. Thus, it is also irrelevant whether the territory which
becomes occupied is under the control of a party to the conflict. Only the
occupant has to be a party to the international conflict for an occupation to
occur therein.7
4 Paragraph 1.3; paragraph 1.4; paragraph 2.5.2; paragraph 3.5.1; paragraph 3.6.
5 Paragraph 2.4; paragraph 3.4; paragraph 4.3.1; paragraph 4.4.1.
6 Paragraph 2.2; paragraph 3.2.
7 Paragraph 3.4.1.
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Occupation is established by a military presence on the territory in question
Since occupation must occur in the context of an international armed conflict,
it is logical that the control which constitutes occupation is established by a
military presence. However, the maintenance of that control is not dependent
of a physical military presence in the occupied territory itself. For example
a military threat combined with occasional enforcement, thus enforcing the
will of the occupant, can be sufficient.8
Occupation only exists when a territory is under the effective control of a party to
the conflict
Flowing from the principle that occupation is a factual situation, the control
that is established by the military presence must be effective. Whether control
is considered effective depends on the instrument on which basis the situation
is assessed.9
Occupation ends as soon as the control is no longer effective
In accordance with the factual character of occupation, it only ends when the
effective control of the occupant is relinquished or diminished in such a way
that it can no longer be regarded as effective. Statements made by whatever
party are, without subsequent action, not sufficient to end an occupation.10
6.3 OCCUPATION ACCORDING TO THE HAGUE REGULATIONS
Definition of occupation
According to the Hague Regulations, occupation exists when the territory is
brought under the effective control of a party to an international conflict by
means of that party’s military presence. Control is considered effective under
the Hague Regulations when the occupant exerts control over the government
functions.11
Effective control over government functions
These government functions entail, but are not limited to: the management
of the internal and external security of the territory, the control of the inter-
national borders including the control of import and export, the passing of
legislation, the development of the economic system and the maintenance of
the international contacts of the territory.12
8 Paragraph 1.3; paragraph 2.5.2; paragraph 3.5.2.
9 Paragraph 1.3; paragraph 1.4; paragraph 2.5; paragraph 3.5.
10 Paragraph 2.6; paragraph 3.6; paragraph 5.2.
11 Paragraph 2.4; paragraph 2.5.
12 Paragraph 2.5.2; paragraph 2.5.3.
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The functions above translate into effective control over the police force,
military and border patrol, customs, civil administration, the banking system
and so on. It is not necessary that the occupant controls all the above men-
tioned government functions. It is neither necessary that the occupant main-
tains effective control over all the government functions it had under effective
control at the start of the occupation, as long as it still amounts to a minimum
of effective control necessary.13
What amounts to the minimum of effective control necessary for occupation
is in its nature case-specific. However, what can be maintained as a bare
minimum, is that the government functions necessary for the enforcement of
the authority are under the control of the occupant. This entails police and
military, and, depending on the geography of the region, could also entail
border control. This also provides the minimum of effective control necessary
to comply with the obligations of article 43 of the Hague Regulations.14
The establishing of an administration
The obligation under the Hague Regulations to establish an administration,
cannot be seen as a criterion for the application of the law of occupation as
laid down in the Hague Regulations. This obligation is not intended to limit
the scope of the law of occupation. Nevertheless, the existence of an admin-
istration is in itself an important indication of effective control.15
6.4 OCCUPATION ACCORDING TO THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION
Definition of occupation
According to the Fourth Geneva Convention, occupation exists when the
population of a territory is brought under the effective control of a party to
an international conflict by means of that party’s military presence. Control
is considered effective under the Fourth Geneva Convention when the people
of a territory are in fact under such control, that the protection of the law of
occupation as laid down in the Fourth Geneva Convention is warranted.16
Factual situation as most important factor
The application of the law of occupation as laid down in the Fourth Geneva
Convention should not be made dependent on a legalistic approach. The facts
indicating the overall control of a party should be weighed as a whole to
decide whether a situation constitutes occupation. The key factor is that the
13 Paragraph 2.5.3.
14 Paragraph 2.5.3.
15 Paragraph 2.5.1.
16 Paragraph 3.5.
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overall control over the population is effective albeit possibly not directly
exercised by the occupant.17
The elapsing of time as a factor in the application of provisions of the Fourth Geneva
Convention
Notwithstanding what is stated below on the object of effective control in the
meaning of the Fourth Geneva Convention, it seems that one year after the
general close of military operations, the Fourth Geneva Convention ceases
to apply to occupied territory. Only a hard core of provisions remains applic-
able, and then only when the occupant has such control over the territory that
it amounts to effective control in the meaning of the Hague Regulations.18
Effective control under the Fourth Geneva Convention and the government functions
The government functions do not necessarily have to be under the control of
the occupant for occupation to exist. Occupation can be constituted by other
forms of control, judged by indicators as described below. Thus, the definition
of what constitutes occupation under the Fourth Geneva Convention is broader
than under the Hague Regulations.19
Indicators for effective control over the sovereignty of the people
This list of indicators for effective control over the sovereignty of the people
contains the most important indicators, but naturally it is not exhaustive.20
· The people of the territory are considered as Protected Persons under the
Fourth Geneva Convention. They can be qualified as such when for
example the control exercised by the party to the conflict strongly influ-
ences the physical, economic and social wellbeing of the population.21
· The control exercised by the party to the conflict, irrespective of the way
this control is exercised, strongly influences the humanitarian situations
which the Fourth Geneva Convention envisages to protect.22
· Aspects of the sovereignty of the people are under the control of a party
to the conflict. These aspects are largely similar to the government functions
discussed in the previous paragraph, but are supplemented with for
example territorial integrity and the principle of non-intervention. It is also
a broader concept, entailing not only the government functions actively
exercised by the occupant, but also actions of the occupant rendering the
exercising of government functions by the legitimate authority ineffect-
ive.23
17 Paragraph 3.5.1; paragraph 3.5.2.
18 Paragraph 3.7.
19 Paragraph 2.5.2; paragraph 3.5.1; paragraph 3.5.2.
20 Paragraph 3.5.2.
21 Paragraph 3.4.2; paragraph 3.5.2.
22 Paragraph 3.5.2; paragraph 3.5.3.
23 Paragraph 2.5.3; paragraph 3.5.2.

Part II

7 Was the Gaza strip Occupied Territory prior
to the Disengagement?
For a good understanding of the current situation in the Gaza Strip, it is
important that the status prior to the Disengagement is discussed. It lays the
groundwork for the assessment of the current situation and it gives an under-
standing of the opinion of Israel and the international community.
7.1 THE STATUS OF THE GAZA STRIP PRIOR TO THE SIX DAY WAR OF 1967
Until 1948, the United Kingdom effectively controlled the Gaza Strip, as part
of the territory of Palestine which the UK held under mandate of the League
of Nations. The UK did not have sovereignty over Palestine. The government
of the UK asked the UN, as successor to the League, to come up with a solution
for the division of the territory after the ending of their mandate in 1948.1
According to the 1947 UN Partition Plan, which was drafted for that purpose,
the Gaza Strip was intended for the Palestinian people.2 The declaration of
the state of Israel, on 14 April 1948, was directly followed by an attack on Israel
by Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. These states had rejected the UN
Partition Plan and wanted to prevent its implementation by the new state.3
In 1948, in the course of this Arab-Israeli War, the Gaza Strip came under
Egyptian military occupation and remained under occupation until 1967. Since
the rejection of the UN Partition Plan it has been under military occupation.4
It is important to note that, while the Gaza Strip was under occupation and
subject to the mandate of the UK, there has been no legitimate sovereign in
the Gaza Strip. Egypt did not assert sovereignty.
The Gaza Strip was occupied by Israel in the course of the Six Day War
in June 1967. This war, which started with the preventive attack by Israel on
the air forces of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Syria and was preceded by increased
tensions in the region, also led to the occupation of the old city of Jerusalem,
the Golan Heights, most parts of the Sinai Peninsula and the West Bank.5 The
situation in the Gaza Strip constituted occupation in the meaning of the Hague
1 Partsch in Bernhardt 1995, p. 1460.
2 UNGA Res 181(II), Part II, Annex A.
3 Partsch in Bernhardt 1995, p. 1461, Malanczuk in Bernhardt 1995, p. 1480, 1481.
4 Benvenisti 2004, p. 108; HPCR Policy Brief 2004, p. 3.
5 Playfair in Playfair 1992, p. 4; Malanczuk in Bernhardt 1995, p. 1462.
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Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention, contrary to the official position
previously held by Israel. This will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
7.2 POSITION OF ISRAEL
Israel has contested the de jure application of the Fourth Geneva Convention
from the start of the occupation.6 The main argument of the Israeli government
for this position, which has been named the “missing reversioner” argument,
was first introduced by the Israeli legal scholar Yehuda Blum. It has also been
promoted by Meir Shamgar, a former Attorney-General and former President
of the Supreme Court of Israel. The argument is premised on the assumption
that for occupation to exist, a legitimate sovereign must have been ousted by
the occupying forces. If the territory in question did not belong to a sovereign
power prior to the occupation, the Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply.7
This argument is based on an interpretation of article 2 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, which differs from the one as set out in chapter 3 of this
essay. According to the “missing reversioner” argument, only paragraph 2
of article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention determines when that convention
is applicable to occupation, instead of paragraph 1 of that article. According
to this argument, a territory can only be considered occupied when it is
territory of a High contracting party.8 Since Egypt was only an occupying
power in the Gaza Strip, there was no sovereign power over the Gaza Strip
at the time of occupation. Thus, no sovereign power was ousted by Israel’s
occupation. According to Israel this leads to the conclusion that the Fourth
Geneva Convention does not apply.9 As explained in Part I of this essay, this
argument is premised on an incorrect interpretation of article 2 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, and thus has no validity under the law of occupation.10
Furthermore, the ICJ has discussed this argument in the Advisory Opinion
on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, and has expressly stated that it is without legal merit.11
The Israeli Supreme Court has not used the argument mentioned above
as the basis for its position that the Fourth Geneva Convention is not applicable
to the OPT.12 With respect to the applicability of the Hague Regulations to
6 Qupty in Playfair 1992, p. 101; Benvenisti 2004, p. 109; Al Mezan Report 2005, p. 11.
7 Shamgar 1971, p. 263-266; Qupty in Playfair 1992, p. 102; Falk/Weston in Playfair 1992,
p. 131; HPCR Policy Brief 2004, p. 4; Cavanaugh in Wippman/Evangelista 2005, p. 239;
Al Mezan Report 2005, p. 11.
8 Art. 2 para. 2 GC IV, in Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 17.
9 Qupty in Playfair 1992, p. 101, 102; HPCR Policy Brief 2004, p. 3, 4; Cavanaugh in Wipp-
man/Evangelista 2005, p. 239; Al Mezan Report 2005, p. 12.
10 See paragraph 3.4.1.
11 ICJ Wall, para. 90-101.
12 Qupty in Playfair 1992, p. 103, 104, 105; Cavanaugh in Wippman/Evangelista 2005, p. 240.
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the OPT, the Israeli Supreme Court has accepted that the Hague Regulations
are directly applicable in municipal courts since they form part of customary
international law. This position was first taken by the court in the case of
Hilu v. Government of Israel of 1972.13 However, with respect to the Fourth
Geneva Convention, the Israeli Supreme Court has maintained that it is not
applicable because it is not customary international law, but contractual
international law. According to the court, the latter is only binding between
states and does not directly apply in municipal courts, as it cannot be con-
sidered part of internal Israeli law without adoption by the Knesset. The court
has taken this position in, for example, the Beit El Settlement case of 1978, the
teachers’ Housing Cooperative Society case of 1982 and the Affo v. IDF Commander
case of 1987.14 However, in a recent judgement, the court has stated that the
Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention are both applicable
to the military operations in the Gaza Strip to the extent that they affect
civilians.15
Israel has stated that it is applying the ‘humanitarian provisions’ of the
convention in the OPT on a de facto basis.16 It is noteworthy that this statement
has led the Israeli Supreme Court to assume that certain provisions of the
Fourth Geneva Convention are applicable tot the OPT.17 However, Israel has
not provided any clarification as to what these humanitarian provisions are.
In my view, it is not reconcilable with the Fourth Geneva Convention that
its parties unilaterally decide which provisions do protect the basic needs of
the population and which do not. This statement is contradictory to the object
and purpose of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which is the protection of the
basic humanitarian needs of the civilian population.18
7.3 OCCUPATION IN THE MEANING OF THE HAGUE REGULATIONS
Applicability and occupation
It is clear that the Six Day War of 1967 constituted an international armed
conflict, as it was an armed conflict between states.19 As mentioned in chap-
ter 2 of this essay, the Hague Regulations have become part of customary inter-
13 ISC H.C. 302/72 (Hilu), para. 180; see also Qupty in Playfair 1992, p. 88, 89, 90; Cavanaugh
2003, section III, fn 38.
14 ISC H.C. 606/78 (Beit El), p. 119, 120; ISC H.C. 393/82 (Teachers’ Housing Cooperative Society),
p. 793, 802; ISC H.C. 785/87 (Affo v IDF Commander), p,. 194, 195; see also Qupty in Playfair
1992, p. 90, 105, 106; Cavanaugh 2003, section III, fn 43; HPCR Policy Brief 2004, p. 5;
Cavanaugh in Wippman/Evangelista 2005, p. 240.
15 ISC 30/05/2004, as quoted in ICJ Wall, para. 100; see also HPCR Policy Brief 2004, p. 5.
16 Shamgar 1971, p. 262; Watson 2000, p. 139; Benvenisti 2004, p. 109; HPCR Policy Brief 2004,
p. 4; Cavanaugh in Wippman/Evangelista 2005, p. 238.
17 ISC H.C. 7015/02 and 7019/02 (Ajuri v IDF Commander), p. 547.
18 See paragraph 3.3.
19 ICJ Wall, para. 101; UNSC Res 242 (1967).
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national law and are therefore binding upon all. Thus, the Hague Regulations
are applicable to all parties to the conflict.
As stated in Part I of this essay, occupation exists when the territory is
brought under the effective control of a party to an international conflict by
means of that party’s military presence. Control is considered effective under
the Hague Regulations when the occupant exerts control over the government
functions.20 Israel has gained control over the Gaza Strip by military means
in the course of an international armed conflict. Subsequently, it has created
an extensive administration for the Gaza Strip.21 Thus, it is clear that Israel
exercised effective control over the government functions in the Gaza Strip
after the Six Day War. Whether this control was previously exercised by the
legitimate sovereign or by another occupying force does not matter.22 The
Gaza Strip was under occupation in the meaning of the Hague Regulations.
The applicability to the OPT as indeed being occupied territory is explicitly
confirmed by the UN General Assembly.23 In addition, the applicability of
the Hague Regulations to the OPT is accepted by Israel and confirmed by the
Supreme Court of Israel.24
7.4 OCCUPATION IN THE MEANING OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION
The Six Day War constituted an international armed conflict. Furthermore,
both Egypt and Israel were parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention at the
outbreak of the conflict.25 As the occupation of the Gaza Strip by Israel
occurred during this conflict, the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable in
the Gaza Strip. This line of reasoning was also followed by the ICJ when it
determined the Fourth Geneva Convention applicable to the occupation of
the West Bank as part of the OPT.26
Since the factual situation in the Gaza Strip prior to the Disengagement
constituted occupation in the meaning of the Hague Regulations, there is little
doubt that it also constituted occupation in the meaning of the Fourth Geneva
Convention. Israel had an extensive administration of the territory, complete
control over airspace and territorial waters, as well as far-reaching influence
on the physical, economic and social wellbeing of the civilian population.
20 See paragraph 6.3.
21 Playfair in Playfair 1992, p. 8, 10; HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 6.
22 See paragraph 6.2; HPCR Policy Brief 2004, p. 7.
23 UNGA Res 58/97; UNGA Res 58/292; UNGA Res ES-10/2.
24 ISC H.C. 302/72 (Hilu), p. 180; ISC H.C. 393/82 (Teachers’ Housing Cooperative Society), p.
793, 802; Qupty in Playfair 1992, p. 90; HPCR Policy Brief 2004, p. 5, 7, 11; HPCR Bruderlein
2004, p. 5.
25 ICRC State Parties List.
26 ICJ Wall, para. 101.
Chapter 7 61
Therefore, the control exercised by Israel extended far beyond the minimum
requirements for occupation.
The applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention, with Israel as the
Occupying power, has frequently been affirmed by the UN Security Council.27
The General Assembly has also affirmed this in its regulars sessions and in
the 10th Emergency Special Session,28 as has the ECOSOC29 and the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights.30 This was endorsed by the ICRC in an
official statement.31
While confirming that the situation in the Gaza Strip constitutes occupation,
the ICJ has stated in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the OPT that only those articles referred to in article
6 paragraph 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention remain applicable in the West
Bank. The reason for this limited applicability is that “the military operations
leading to the occupation of the West Bank in 1967 ended a long time ago”.32
It can be assumed that the same reasoning applies to the situation in the Gaza
Strip. In my opinion, this limited applicability of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion is, although understandable from a legal point of view, highly unsatis-
factory when the military forces of the occupant still conduct military opera-
tions in the occupied territory on a daily basis.
7.5 THE IMPACT OF THE OSLO ACCORDS
The Oslo Accords are a variety of agreements concluded between Israel and
the PLO. The first agreement was the Declaration of Principles (hereinafter:
the DoP) of 1993.33 It envisaged a withdrawal by the military from the Gaza
Strip.34 In practice, the military did not completely withdraw from the Gaza
Strip, but merely redeployed in and around settlements.35 The DoP also en-
visaged a transfer of power from Israel to the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip,
to be specified in the Interim Agreement.36 Israel transferred the responsibility
for the internal security of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinians, while retaining
27 See for example UNSC Res 452 (1979); UNSC Res 681 (1990); UNSC Res 1544 (2004).
28 UNGA Res 56/60; UNGA Res 58/97; UNGA Res 58/292; UNGA Res ES-10/2; UNGA Res
ES-10/11.
29 ECOSOC Res 2001/19.
30 Statement UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 05/12/01.
31 ICRC Official Statement 05/12/2001, para. 2.
32 ICJ Wall, para. 125.
33 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (13/09/93), in Watson
2000, p. 317.
34 Art. XIV DoP 1993; Shehadeh 1997, p. 24, 25; Watson 2000, p. 41, 42.
35 Shehadeh 1997, p. 52; Watson 2000, p. 106, 107.
36 Art. VI and VII DoP 1993; Shehadeh 1997, p. 16, 17, 24; Watson 2000, p. 41, 42.
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the responsibility for defending it against external threats and in the ‘overall
security of Israelis’.37
Another important agreement is the Interim Agreement of 1995 (also known
as Oslo II).38 This is the detailed implementation of the DoP. By virtue of
the Interim Agreement, Israel transferred part, but not all, of the powers and
responsibilities from the military government and Civil Administration to the
Palestinians.39 Furthermore, it provided for a scheme on the transfer of terri-
torial jurisdiction, in which settlements, Israelis and military installations areas
remained under the jurisdiction of Israel.40 Israel also retained all the powers
necessary to protect the Israelis and settlements, continued to carry the respons-
ibility for the defense against external threats,41 and retained legal jurisdiction
over foreign relations, borders and Palestinian refugees.42
As a result of the above mentioned documents, which have been elaborated
on in numerous appendices, a large part of the powers and responsibilities
for the OPT was transferred to the Palestinians. However, an equally large part
of powers and responsibilities remained with Israel. As politically important
as it was to provide the Palestinians with a considerable level of self-govern-
ance, this did not alter the legal status of occupied territory. Israel still had
a military presence in the Gaza Strip. Israel retained considerable powers and
responsibilities by virtue of the Oslo Accords. In addition to what was explicit-
ly determined in those agreements, Israel also retained all powers and responsi-
bilities not transferred to the Palestinians.43 In conclusion, Israel still had
effective control over the Gaza Strip, amounting to occupation in the meaning
of the Hague Regulations as well as the Fourth Geneva Convention.
It seems apparent that the Oslo Accords were not intended to alter the
legal status of the OPT. In the Interim Agreement it is specifically determined
that it was not intended to change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, and that neither party waived any existing rights, claims or positions.44
The view that the Gaza Strip and the rest of the OPT remained occupied
territory after the Oslo Accords was confirmed by the ICJ,45 the UN Security
Council,46 and the UN General Assembly.47
37 Art. VIII DoP 1993.
38 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (28/09/95),
in Watson 2000, p.349.
39 Art. I.1 Interim Agreement 1995; Shehadeh 1997, p. 34.
40 Art. XI.2 and XVII.2-a Interim Agreement 1995; Shehadeh 1997, p. 35, 36, 37.
41 Art. XII.1 Interim Agreement 1995.
42 Art. XVII Interim Agreement 1995; Shehadeh 1997, p. 35, 36.
43 Art. XVII.1-b Interim Agreement 1995.
44 Art. XXXI.6 and XXXI.7 Interim Agreement 1995; HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 6; Al Mezan
Report 2005, p. 16.
45 ICJ Wall, para. 78.
46 UNSC Res 1544 (2004); see also paragraph 7.3.
47 UNGA Res 58/292; see also paragraphs 7.2 and 7.3.
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7.6 CONCLUSION
The Gaza Strip has been under Israeli occupation since 1967. Although Israel
has always contested the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to
the OPT, it has recognized its status as occupying power. Its denial of the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention is without legal grounds. This
is confirmed by the view of the international community. It is also confirmed
in numerous documents issued by UN organs, such as the Security Council,
the General Assembly and the ICJ. The Oslo Accords did not change the legal
status of the Gaza Strip.

8 The revised Disengagement Plan of
6 June 2004
8.1 THE AIM OF THE DISENGAGEMENT PLAN
In April 2004 the government of Israel presented a Disengagement Plan, with
the purpose of regulating the withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip. After
the rejection of this Disengagement Plan in Israel’s internal political process,
a revised version was presented.1 This was the ‘Revised Disengagement Plan
of 6 June 2004’ (hereinafter: the Plan).2
According to this Plan “the completion of the plan will serve to dispel
claims regarding Israel’s responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip”.3
This expresses the view of the government of Israel that the implementation
of the Plan will end the occupation of the Gaza Strip, since that is the basis
of Israel’s responsibilities for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.4
By implementing the plan, Israel intended to create a better security,
political, economic and demographic situation.5 Although it is not specified
whether this intention extends to the whole region or just Israel, it can be
assumed that it primarily applies to the latter. It is clear that the Plan has a
unilateral character, which is confirmed by the plan itself.6
8.2 THE CONTROL OVER THE GAZA STRIP WHICH IS RELINQUISHED BY ISRAEL
The Plan stipulates that after its implementation there will be no permanent
presence of Israeli Security forces in the areas of the Gaza Strip territory that
have been evacuated.7 Thus, all military bases will be dismantled and eva-
cuated.8 Also, all roadblocks and checkpoints on the roads of the Gaza Strip
which were in place9 will disappear, since there will be no military forces
1 HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 4.
2 Revised Disengagement Plan 06/06/2004 (Addendum A-Main Principles). See annex.
3 Disengagement Plan, para. 1 principle 6.
4 HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 1, 7; Al Mezan Report 2005, p. 3.
5 Disengagement Plan, para. 1 principle 2.
6 Disengagement Plan, para. 1 preamble and principle 1, para. 13; Al Mezan Report 2005,
p. 5.
7 Disengagement Plan, para. 2.3.1 principle 2.
8 Disengagement Plan, para. 4.
9 Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December 2005, para. 6.
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to give effect to these measures. Since the settlements are also being evacuated
from the Gaza Strip, the military force assigned to protect the settlers will no
longer be there.10
However, the wording of the principles discussed in this paragraph implies
that there are also parts of Gaza Strip territory that will not be evacuated and
will therefore continue to have a permanent presence of Israeli security forces.
On further examination of the Plan it can be seen which parts are meant by
this, or at least some of them.
8.3 CONTINUED MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE GAZA STRIP
The Plan stipulates that Israel will continue to exercise security activity in the
sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip.11 This entails continued military presence
in its territorial waters. Israel also maintains exclusive authority over the
airspace of the Gaza Strip.12 This entails continued military presence in the
skies above the Gaza Strip and may well entail military presence on the airport
of the Gaza Strip, although this has been disabled by the IDF in earlier military
actions.
Israeli military forces will remain present in the border area between the
Gaza Strip and Egypt (also known as the ‘Philadelphi Route’).13 In addition
to this, the Plan explicitly provides the possibility that the area where military
forces remain present will be expanded when this is required by ‘security
considerations’.14
Israel will also continue to guard and monitor the rest of the external land
perimeter of the Gaza Strip.15 It is not specified in the Plan whether this will
consist only of guarding and monitoring the border on Israeli territory or
whether this also entails military presence on the territory of the Gaza Strip.
The latter will be the case when the arrangements for guarding and monitoring
the rest of the border remain unchanged, as they do at the border between
the Gaza Strip and Egypt.16 Paragraph 3.1 principle 1 of the Plan, in which
the provision on border-control is laid down, further only prescribes continu-
ing, unchanging control over the Gaza Strip. The placement of this provision
within the Plan confirms that continuing military presence for the purpose
of border control on the Gaza side of the border is a realistic possibility.
10 Disengagement Plan, para. 2.3.1 principles 1 and 2.
11 Disengagement Plan, para. 3.1 principle 1.
12 Disengagement Plan, para. 3.1 principle 1.
13 Disengagement Plan, para. 2.3.1 principle 1; Disengagement Plan, para. 6.
14 Disengagement Plan, para. 6.
15 Disengagement Plan, para. 3.1 principle 1.
16 Disengagement Plan, para. 11.a principle 1; see also paragraph 8.4.2.
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8.4 CONTINUING CONTROL OVER THE GAZA STRIP BY ISRAEL
The principle of state sovereignty is not directly applicable to the relation
between Israel and the Gaza Strip, because the latter is part of a territorial
unit which is not a state. However, the sovereignty of an occupied territory
is an important aspect of the law of occupation. Regardless of its applicability,
the principle of state sovereignty is an important instrument in determining
the effectiveness of control of the occupant.17 Therefore, this principle is used
in the current paragraph for placing the continuing control of Israel over the
Gaza Strip in the context of international law.
8.4.1 Continuing control over Gaza territory, airspace and territorial waters
An important part of state sovereignty is territorial sovereignty, which relates
to the exclusivity of the competence of the state regarding its own territory.18
Territorial sovereignty also extends to the airspace.19 As stipulated in the Plan,
Israel will continue to maintain exclusive authority over the airspace of the
Gaza Strip.20 If the Gaza Strip would be part of a state this would be a serious
violation of the principle of territorial sovereignty.
Territorial waters are also subject to the territorial sovereignty of a state,
only restricted by the right of innocent passage.21 The Plan stipulates that
Israel will maintain its control over the territorial waters of the Gaza Strip.22
If the Gaza Strip would be part of a state it would be a serious violation of
the principle of territorial sovereignty to maintain military presence off the
coast of the Gaza Strip for security reasons.
Exclusive competence regarding a state’s territory would also extend to
the maintenance and development of the infrastructure on its territory. The
Plan suggests that authorities in the Gaza Strip will not be allowed to establish
a seaport or airport in the Gaza Strip without the approval of Israel.23 If the
Gaza Strip would be part of a state, this too would be a violation of the terri-
torial sovereignty.
It is suggested that such permission will depend on (security) arrangements
between Egypt and the authorities in the Gaza Strip.24 By this Israel clearly
intends to influence the security system and the economic system of the Gaza
Strip. If the latter would be part of a state this influence would be contrary
17 See paragraph 3.5.
18 PCA Island of Palmas, p. 838.
19 ICJ Nicaragua, p. 14, 128; Shaw 2003, p. 464.
20 Disengagement Plan, para. 3.1 principle 1.
21 Shaw 2003, p. 506, 507.
22 Disengagement Plan, para. 3.1 principle 1.
23 Disengagement Plan, para. 6.
24 Disengagement Plan, para. 6.
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to the principle of non-intervention. This principle is linked to the principle
of state sovereignty and can be derived from article 2(1) of the UN Charter.25
It is part of customary law,26 and contains a duty not to intervene with the
internal or external affairs of a state.27 The internal security of the territory
undoubtedly falls within the internal affairs of the state.28 These internal
affairs also include the choice of political, economic and social systems.29
8.4.2 Control over the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip
The Plan explicitly states that the arrangements for the passage of the border
between Egypt and the Gaza Strip remain unchanged.30 This control is effectu-
ated by the continued presence of the military in the border area. With regard
to the rest of the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, it is made clear
that Israel will guard and monitor it. As discussed in the previous paragraph
there is a realistic possibility that the monitoring of this part of the border,
including arrangements for the passage of persons, will also remain unchanged.
However, it is stated in the Plan that the Erez Checkpoint, on the northern
border between the Gaza Strip and Israel, will be moved to a location within
Israel sometime after the implementation of the Plan.31
The Plan makes no arrangements for the passage of persons between the
Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Passage between these two pieces of land,
which together are considered one single territorial unit by Israel and the
Palestinians,32 can only be realised by transfer over Israeli territory. This fact,
together with the lack of mentioning of passage between the Gaza Strip and
the West Bank in the Plan, suggests that such passage will remain fully under
the control of Israel. This suggestion is strengthened by the apparent lack of
change in other border arrangements.
The Plan also stipulates that there will be no change in the regime regard-
ing the entry and exit of goods between the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Israel
and abroad.33 This is a very important stipulation, since it effectively keeps
all international trade of the Gaza Strip under the control of Israel. It further
hampers the transfer of goods within the single territorial unit which is formed
by the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
25 Brownlie 1998, p. 293; Nolte in Simma 2002, p. 151.
26 ICJ Nicaragua, para. 202; Shaw 2003, p. 191, 1039.
27 ICJ Nicaragua, para. 205; Brownlie 1998, p. 293; Shaw 2003, p. 191, 572.
28 HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 9.
29 ICJ Nicaragua, para. 205 ; HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 9.
30 Disengagement Plan, para. 11.a principle 1.
31 Disengagement Plan, para. 12.
32 Art. IV DoP 1993; Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December 2005, p. 8.
33 Disengagement Plan, para. 10 principle 1.
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The regulating of the external borders falls within the internal as well as
external affairs of a state. International trade is an important part of the eco-
nomic system of a state, and can be seen as part of the external affairs of a
state.34 If the Gaza Strip would be part of a state, Israel’s stipulated control
over the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, including the entry and
exit of persons and goods and the control of international trade, would thus
be a serious violation of the principle of non-intervention.35 The hampering
of movement of goods and persons between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank
is contrary to the territorial integrity of this territorial unit.36
8.4.3 Continuing control over the ‘internal affairs’ of the Gaza Strip
It is stipulated in the Plan that, among others, the following arrangements
will remain in force: the tax and customs regime, the monetary regime and
postal and telecommunications arrangements.37 As stated, it is prohibited
to intervene with the internal affairs of a state, which include the choice of
political, economic and social systems.38 In my view, these systems would
include all those arrangements mentioned in the Plan.
The Plan also determines that Israel maintains the authority to decide
whether a foreign security force is allowed to enter the Gaza Strip.39 As stated
above, the security of the territory would definitely qualify as part of the
internal affairs of a state. If the Gaza Strip would be part of a state, this stipula-
tion would be a violation of the principle of non-intervention. The authority
to allow a foreign security force into one’s territory flows directly from the
territorial sovereignty of that state.40
8.5 OTHER ISSUES RELATING TO THE PLAN AND THE LAW OF OCCUPATION
The Plan also determines that the process described in it is without prejudice
to the relevant agreements between Israel and the Palestinians.41 This would
also include the Oslo Accords. This suggests that it is not Israel’s intention
to go against what is stated in those accords, and more specifically that it is
not contesting that the Gaza Strip is still seen as one single territorial unit
34 HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 9.
35 See also paragraph 8.4.1.
36 Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December 2005, p. 8.
37 Disengagement Plan, para. 10 principles two, three and four.
38 ICJ Nicaragua, para. 205 ; See also paragraph 8.4.1.
39 Disengagement Plan, para. 5.
40 Shaw 2003, p. 192.
41 Disengagement Plan, para. 1 principle 7.
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together with the West Bank.42 This creates some inconsistency with other
provisions of the Plan.43
What is also relevant for the question of occupation is Israel’s stipulated
right of self-defence. It is stipulated in the Plan that Israel “reserves its funda-
mental right of self-defence, both preventive and reactive, including where
necessary the use of force, in respect of threats emanating from the Gaza
Strip”.44 It must be stressed here that preventive self-defence is contrary to
article 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter.45 Assuming the occupation would end,
Israel’s right of self-defence is based on customary international law and the
UN Charter. A preventive right of self-defence in this situation could only flow
from a broader scope of powers under the international law of occupation.46
This would be contradictory to Israel’s own statement on the ending of occupa-
tion.
What must further be noted is that nowhere in the Plan arrangements are
made with respect to the civilian prisoners originating from the Gaza Strip
and being detained by Israel. Successfully ending the occupation should entail
arrangements concerning civilians imprisoned during the occupation.47
8.6 CONCLUSION
The Plan proposes considerable changes in the factual situation in the territory
of the Gaza Strip, leading to free movement of the people within the Gaza
Strip. However, it also contains numerous provisions which maintain Israel’s
continuing control over the Gaza Strip and its population. This includes
monitoring and controlling all means of entry and exit of the Gaza Strip.
Considering this continuing control, occupation may not have ended. It is
stated by Israel that its responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip
will end by implementation of the Plan.48 It remains to be seen whether Is-
rael’s assertion is correct.
42 Art. IV DoP 1993; Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December 2005, p. 8.
43 See paragraph 8.4.2.
44 Disengagement Plan, para. 3.1 principle 3.
45 Shaw 2003, p. 1029, 1030; HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 13.
46 HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 13.
47 HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 13; Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December 2005, p. 8.
48 See paragraph 8.1.
9 The situation in the Gaza Strip subsequent
to the Disengagement
9.1 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN
The implementation of the Plan took place in August and September 2005 and
was officially completed on 12 September 2005.1 Based on the wide acceptance
of this date as the completion date of implementation of the Plan, it can be
assumed that all aspects of the Plan were implemented. The implementation
of elements of the Plan, which are important for the assessment whether
occupation still exists, is further illustrated by media reports and other sources.
9.2 MILITARY PRESENCE AND MILITARY ACTIONS LEADING TO CONTROL OVER
THE TERRITORY
The freedom of movement of the Palestinians inside the Gaza Strip improved
after the Disengagement. Israeli checkpoints which impeded the freedom of
movement are no longer present in the Gaza Strip.2
The exclusive authority over the airspace of the Gaza Strip lies with Israel
and is enforced strictly.3 There are numerous reports of Israeli military aircrafts
opening fire on installations on the ground.4 The United Nations Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has confirmed, as have other
sources, that these attacks have resulted in civilian casualties and injured
civilians, including women and children, in numerous occasions.5 Also worry-
ing is the new practice of mock attacks by Israeli warplanes, as well as Israeli
warplanes making so-called sonic booms. These actions create panic among
1 Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December 2005, p. 2, 6, 8; PCHR 19/09/05; PCHR
21/09/05; PHR-Israel 26/09/05; PCHR 05/10/05; Amnesty International 07/10/05; B’Tselem
26/04/06; HRW Overview 2005.
2 Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December 2005, p. 8; B’Tselem 26/04/06.
3 Al-Dameer 24/09/05; Amnesty International 07/10/05; PCHR 10/10/05; HRW 23/12/2005;
Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December 2005, p. 9; B’Tselem 26/04/06; BBC
Country Profile; BBC Interview 08/2006 Hourani.
4 WAFA 26/09/05; WAFA 25/10/05; WAFA 14/12/05; HRW Overview 2005; B’Tselem 07/
03/06; Amnesty International 11/04/06; OCHA 12/04/06; B’Tselem 22/05/06; OCHA 07/
06/06; OCHA 21/06/06; B’Tselem 22/06/06.
5 OCHA 12/04/06; WAFA 24/09/05 (air strikes); WAFA 25/10/05; WAFA 14/12/05;
Amnesty International 11/04/06; B’Tselem 22/06/06.
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the population of the Gaza Strip and occasionally causes material damage.
There are also reports of medical complaints due to these actions by the Israeli
Air Force.6 The Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights,
John Dugard, as well as several human rights organizations, have qualified
these sonic booms as a way of collective punishment, which is prohibited
under the Fourth Geneva Convention.7
The control over the territorial waters of the Gaza Strip by Israel is ob-
vious.8 It is enforced strictly by the Israeli navy. There are reports of Israeli
gunboats opening fire on fishermen, as well as on other civilians and civilian
installations on shore. There are reports of casualties and injured civilians,
including women and children, as a result of these attacks.9 Israel also has
imposed severe restrictions on fishing.10
Israeli armed forces have made numerous incursions into the Gaza Strip.
OCHA has confirmed, as have other sources, that Palestinian civilians were
injured and killed during these incursions.11 The population in civilian resi-
dential areas of the Gaza Strip has also been subject to Israeli artillery fire.
There are reports of numerous injured and high amounts of casualties due
to these attacks.12 Among those victims are several women and children. OCHA
has stated that the artillery bombardments cause severe psycho-social strain
on the civilian population, especially on children. OCHA also points to the risks
associated with the large amount of unexploded artillery shells.13
9.3 BORDER CONTROL BY ISRAEL
As stipulated in the Plan, Israel monitors and guards the borders of the Gaza
Strip. However, the way in which this guarding takes place was not stipulated
in the Plan. Over the whole length of the border with Israel, Israeli troops are
deployed on the territory of the Gaza Strip, where Israel has created a buffer
zone of up to 300 metres wide. Israeli armed forces have demolished houses
6 WAFA 24/09/05 (air strikes); Al-Dameer 27/09/05; WAFA 28/09/05 (mock raids); WAFA
25/10/05; WAFA 26/10/05; WAFA 28/12/05; BBC Interview 08/2006 Hourani.
7 Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December 2005, p. 8, 9; GCMHP 14/11/05; PHR-
Israel 14/11/05.
8 Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December 2005, p. 9; HRW Overview 2005; Amnesty
International 07/10/05; PCHR 10/10/05; WAFA 16/10/05; B’Tselem 26/04/06; BBC Country
Profile.
9 WAFA 24/09/05 (navy attacks); WAFA 25/09/05; WAFA 12/11/05; WAFA 03/12/05;
HRW 20/06/06.
10 PCHR 11/2005.
11 WAFA 04/10/05; WAFA 10/10/05; WAFA 10/11/05; PCHR 11/2005; WAFA 03/12/05;
Amnesty International 11/04/06; OCHA 07/06/06; BBC Interview 08/2006 Fayyad.
12 PCHR 11/2005; WAFA 04/12/05; HRW Overview 2005; Amnesty International 11/04/06;
B’Tselem 16/04/06; HRW 20/06/06; OCHA 12/04/06; OCHA 07/06/06; OCHA 21/06/06.
13 OCHA 12/04/06.
Chapter 9 73
and agricultural land to establish this buffer zone and ordered every
Palestinian to leave these areas.14 These areas are frequently fired upon, and
there are reports that the Israeli armed forces have received orders to open
fire at anyone who enters the buffer zone.15
In addition to this stringent border guarding policy, Israel has full control
over the few crossings between the Gaza Strip and Israel, and it frequently
uses this control to close down these crossings.16 Israel imposes these closures
despite the Agreement on Movement and Acces of 15 November 2005 between
Israel and the PA.17 According to OCHA and other sources, the closures of
these crossings, and especially the frequent closure of the Karni crossing, have
a very negative influence on basic food supplies and medical supplies of the
population of the Gaza Strip, as well as on the development of the economy
of the region because of the discontinued flow of workers and products.18
Directly after the implementation of the Plan, the Rafah crossing between
the Gaza Strip and Egypt was still controlled by Israeli armed forces, despite
the fact that it is not a border of Israeli territory. Directly following the imple-
mentation of the Plan, Israel imposed a closure of the Rafah crossing which
had a very negative influence on the medical care, education and economic
situation of the population of the Gaza Strip.19 Since the Agreement on Move-
ment and Access between Israel and the PA of 15 November 2005, the Rafah
crossing has been under direct Palestinian control, with the support of EUBAM,
the EU Border Assistance Mission.20 However, Israel still has some residual
control over the crossing, because it is monitored by Israeli officials. In combi-
nation with this, Israel maintains the right to complain about who crosses at
Rafah and has already done so.21 The crossing is still only open for pedes-
trians and outgoing goods.22
Following the restrictions on movement in and out of the Gaza Strip, and
despite the earlier mentioned Agreement on Movement and Access, the move-
ment between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is still completely under
14 HRW 29/10/04; HRW 02/11/04; PCHR 19/09/05; PCHR 09/2005; WAFA 25/12/05; WAFA
28/12/05 (flyers); B’Tselem 29/12/05; Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December
2005, p. 9; OCHA 07/06/06; BBC Country Profile.
15 WAFA 27/12/05; WAFA 28/12/05 (flyers); B’Tselem 29/12/05; B’Tselem 28/02/06; OCHA
07/06/06; OCHA 21/06/06.
16 Amnesty International 07/10/05; Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December 2005,
p. 9; HRW Overview 2005; OCHA 19/03/06; Amnesty International 23/03/06; B’Tselem
26/04/06; BBC Country Profile.
17 UNSC 01/12/05; OCHA 19/03/06; OCHA 07/06/06.
18 PHR-Israel 26/09/05; GCMHP 06/10/05; HRW 23/12/05; OCHA 19/03/06; Amnesty
International 23/03/06; Amnesty International 25/04/06; OCHA 07/06/06; BBC Country
Profile.
19 Al-Dameer 24/09/05; PCHR 05/10/05; GCMHP 06/10/05; Amnesty International 07/10/05;
EMHRN 21/10/05.
20 EU 15/11/05; UNSC 01/12/05; OCHA 07/06/06; Amnesty International 23/03/06.
21 Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December 2005, p. 9.
22 UNSC 01/12/05; Amnesty International 23/03/06; BBC Country Profile.
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Israeli control and is subject to severe restrictions.23 These restrictions have
a negative influence on the health care in the Gaza Strip.24 This movement
between the two parts of the Palestinian self-determination unit is also influ-
enced by Israel through their continuing control over the issuance of identity
documents.25
9.4 OTHER FORMS OF CONTROL WHICH ARE RETAINED BY ISRAEL
Israel still administers the population register of the Gaza Strip, which provides
Israel with control over the issuance of identity documents to the population
of the Gaza Strip.26 The control over the population register, and thereby over
the issuance of identity documents to the Palestinians, provides Israel with
considerable influence over who can move in and out of the territory. This
includes travel between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.27
The Gaza Strip also remains dependent on Israel for the supply of elec-
tricity. By threatening to cut off the electricity, Israel uses this dependence
to put pressure on the population of the Gaza Strip.28 The valid currency
of the Gaza Strip is still the New Israeli Shekel, which leads to full Israeli
control over the monetary system.29 Israel also has substantial control over
the tax system of the Gaza Strip.30 Moreover, Israel maintains control over
vital parts of the infrastructure of the Gaza Strip, such as the telecommunica-
tion network, the water supplies and the sewage networks.31
In addition, Israel still holds approximately 650 prisoners originating from
the Gaza Strip. According to article 77 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, these
prisoners should be released at the close of occupation. The fact that this
release has not yet taken place shows the unwillingness of Israel to comply
with its international obligations and its unwillingness to release control over
the population of the Gaza Strip.32
23 PHR-Israel 26/09/05; Amnesty International 07/10/05; WAFA 05/11/05; UNSC 01/12/05;
Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December 2005, p. 9; Amnesty International 25/04/
06; B’Tselem 26/04/06.
24 PHR-Israel 26/09/05; Amnesty International 07/10/05; B’Tselem 26/04/06.
25 See paragraph 9.4.
26 Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December 2005, p. 9; HRW 23/12/05; HRW
Overview 2005; B’Tselem 26/04/06.
27 Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December 2005, p. 9.
28 Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December 2005, p. 9; HRW 23/12/05.
29 HRW 29/10/04; HRW 02/11/04; CIA World Fact Book.
30 B’Tselem 26/04/06.
31 HRW 23/12/05; HRW Overview 2005.
32 Art. 77 GC VI, in Pictet 1958, p. 366; Report of Special Rapporteur Dugard of December
2005, p. 9; Al-Dameer 24/09/05; WAFA 18/09/05; PCHR 21/09/05.
10 Is the applicability of the law of occupation
influenced by the right of self-determination
of the Palestinian people?
One issue that is of primary importance to the Israeli-Palestine conflict is the
law of self-determination. The concept of self-determination, as well as its
applicability to the Palestinian people, has been dealt with extensively by legal
scholars, as well as the ICJ and the UN.1 Since this essay only intends to deal
with the law of occupation as applicable in the Israeli-Palestine conflict, the
law of self-determination on itself is not elaborated upon here. However, some
legal scholars put forward the opinion that the right of self-determination of
the Palestinian people is of direct influence on the question whether or not
the Gaza Strip is still occupied by Israel. Special Rapporteur John Dugard,
in his report of December 2005, briefly refers to such a connection between
occupation and self-determination.2 However, it is not a widespread view
under legal scholars writing on the situation in the Gaza Strip or the law of
occupation in general.
It is noteworthy that the ICJ, in dealing with the law of occupation as
applicable to the OPT, does refer to the right of self-determination of the
Palestinian people, but does not make mention of a direct influence of the latter
on the applicability of the former.3 Some scholars discussing the applicability
of the law of occupation to the OPT do not refer to the influence of the law
of self-determination on the existence of occupation in any way.4 Other
scholars do discuss the influence of the law of self-determination on the law
1 For an extensive discussion of the law of self-determination in theory and practice, although
not on the question of the Palestinian people specifically, see Raicˇ 2002; See also Cassese
1995, especially p. 230-247 on the Palestinian rights; For a detailed overview of the develop-
ment of the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people, see UN Report on Self-
Determination of Palestinian people 1979; another authoritative work on the Palestinian
right of self-determination is Mallison/Mallison 1986, p. 188-204; For a critical view on
the work of Mallison and Mallison, and an Israeli perspective on the law of self-deter-
mination of the Palestinian people, see Stone 1981; For an interesting presentation of the
pro-Palestinian versus the pro-Israeli views of the discussion on the right of self-determina-
tion, see ASIL Proceedings 1988; For another historical appraisal of the development of
the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people and the two-state solution, see
Hodgkins 2004; For an authoritative statement on the existence of the right of self-determina-
tion of the Palestinian people, see ICJ Wall, para. 88, 149, 155, 159; In this respect see also
UNGA Resolution 58/163.
2 Report of special Rapporteur Dugard of December 2005, p. 9.
3 ICJ Wall, para. 88, 89-101.
4 Dinstein 1995; Cavanaugh in Wippman/Evangelista 2005; Al Mezan Report 2005.
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of occupation. However, these scholars do not view the right of self-determina-
tion as being of influence on the question whether a territory is under occupa-
tion.5 Falk and Weston do not refer to the continued existence of occupation
as obligatory until the complete exercise of the right of self-determination.
They treat these issues separately, although they do correctly state that occupa-
tion violates the right of self-determination.6 Pellet discusses the influence
of self-determination on the rights and duties of an occupant extensively.7
However, he also emphasises that the existence of occupation is fully de-
pendent on the factual effective control of the occupant, without which occupa-
tion cannot exist.8 Bruderlein states that while occupation may end by the
successful exercise of self-determination, the relevant criteria always remain
factual.9 Accordingly, he does not consider violation of the right of self-deter-
mination to be one of the legal consequences of the end of occupation in the
Gaza Strip.10
To my best knowledge, the only legal scholar who discusses the above-
mentioned opinion extensively, is Professor Iain Scobbie in his article on the
withdrawal of Israel.11 Therefore, I will show why, in my opinion, the law
of self-determination is not of direct influence on occupation by reviewing
the arguments of Professor Scobbie. I feel compelled to make two general
remarks. Firstly, I fully agree with Professor Scobbie that the right of self-
determination is of paramount importance to the Israeli-Palestine conflict, albeit
I do not agree with some of the consequences attributed to this right by him.
Secondly, I am of the opinion that Israel remains responsible for the population
of the Gaza Strip since, as I will show in the conclusion of this essay, in my
view the Gaza Strip remains under Israeli occupation.
Arguments and conclusion of Professor Scobbie
The key issue for the assessment whether the law of self-determination is of
direct influence on the law of occupation is the following: what will the status
be of the Gaza Strip, if it is no longer occupied? Scobbie discusses in his article
various propositions of what that legal status could be, and eventually reaches
the conclusion that there are no other options but for the Gaza Strip to become
the territory of a sovereign Palestinian state. However, he convincingly argues
that this option is at this point not possible under international law. For this,
he has the following arguments:
5 Falk and Weston in Playfair 1992; Pellet in Playfair 1992; HPCR Roberts 2004; HPCR
Bruderlein 2004.
6 Falk and Weston in Playfair 1992, p. 144-149.
7 Pellet in Playfair 1992, p. 180-187.
8 Pellet in Playfair 1992, p. 174-176.
9 HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 10.
10 HPCR Bruderlein 2004, p. 12, 13.
11 Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, An intimate disengagement: Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, the law of
occupation and of self-determination.
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· Through Israel’s unilateral ending of occupation, the Gaza Strip would
be forced to exercise its right of self-determination. This is contrary to what
Scobbie identifies as the process aspect of self-determination: the right of
a people to freely determine, without external interference, their political
status. By ending the occupation, Israel would force the population of the
Gaza Strip to exercise their right, instead of letting them choose freely.
Thus, Israel would violate the law of self-determination.12
· By forcing the population of the Gaza Strip to emerge as a separate state,
Israel would violate what Scobbie identifies as the substantive aspect of
self-determination; the right of self-determination of a people implies a
title to a distinct territorial unit. This unit possesses some form of territorial
integrity under the law of self-determination. By forcing the Gaza Strip
to attain a different legal status then the West Bank, this territorial integrity,
and thus the law of self-determination, would be violated by Israel.13
· A sovereign Palestinian state can only emerge when it fulfils all the criteria
for statehood under international law. Even if the Gaza Strip fulfils the
traditional conditions as laid down in the Montevideo Convention, it does
not fulfil the normative component that it must be created in conformity
with international law. Creation of a Palestinian state on the Gaza Strip
is contrary to both the procedural and substantive aspect of self-determina-
tion, and can therefore not be seen as created in accordance with inter-
national law.14
Based on these arguments, Scobbie reaches the conclusion that there is no other
possibility than to view the situation as continued occupation until the self-
determination unit as a whole can become a sovereign Palestinian state. Ending
of the occupation when this condition is not met, is contrary to the law of self-
determination and thus void.15
A different view on the nature of the law of occupation
My view of the nature of the law of occupation and the legal status of the Gaza
Strip leads to a different conclusion. There are two main reasons for that.
Firstly, I believe there is another option for the status of the Gaza Strip besides
occupation and the emergence of a Palestinian state. Secondly, in my view
occupation and (newly established) sovereignty are not interchangeable legal
statuses. Since these two reasons are very closely intertwined, I will discuss
the nature of occupation in comparison to that of the principal legal status
of a territory first.
12 Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, p. 24, 25.
13 Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, p. 23, 24.
14 Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, p. 27, 28, 29.
15 Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, p. 21, 29-30.
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It is widely accepted that when (part of) a sovereign state becomes
occupied, this occupation does not transfer or destroy the state sovereignty
over that territory. Although the sovereignty of the territory is violated by
the occupation because of another state’s control over the territory, the
occupied territory remains (part of) a sovereign state.16 Occupation is only
a factual situation of a temporary nature, while state sovereignty remains the
principal legal status of an occupied territory. Occupation is thus in its nature
different from the principal legal status of a territory, as it can co-exist on a
territorial unit.
The principal legal status of the Gaza Strip
Thus, occupation cannot be the principal legal status of a territory in itself,
but rather is a factual situation which violates the principal legal status. There
is a principal legal status ’underneath the blanket of occupation’, and the
question arises what the principal legal status of the Gaza Strip is.
History shows that this is exactly the key issue concerning this unique piece
of world territory. Until 1947, the principal legal status of the Gaza Strip was
that of territory under British mandate. After the ending of the mandate, this
legal status ceased to exist and the territory was occupied by Egypt.17 As
explained above, occupation cannot be considered as the principal legal status
of a territory. Egypt’s occupation was followed by the Israel’s occupation of
the Gaza Strip, which likewise did not provide the territory with a principal
legal status.
Of course this does not mean that the Gaza Strip has no principal legal
status at all. As is recognized by the ICJ and the international community,
including Israel, the Palestinian people possess the right of self-determina-
tion.18 Part of this right of self-determination is what Scobbie identifies as
the substantive aspect. It is recognized by all authorities that the territorial
self-determination unit which the Palestinian people is entitled to, is formed
by the West Bank and the Gaza Strip together.19 The occupation of Israel of
the whole of this territorial unit has never negatively influenced this right of
self-determination. This right exists and is connected to the territory regardless
of its occupied status.
It seems that the principle of self-determination functions just like the
principle of state sovereignty under the law of occupation. From both prin-
ciples flows some form of territorial integrity, and respect for both principles
is an obligation erga omnes and possibly ius cogens.20 Both principles are un-
deniably violated by occupation, but both are neither transferred nor annulled
16 Paragraph 6.1.
17 Paragraph 7.1.
18 ICJ Wall, para. 118; UNGA Res 58/163.
19 Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, p. 23, 24.
20 Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, p. 10-11, 20-21, 22-23.
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by occupation. The violation of both flows logically from the nature of the
law of occupation, which is based on effective control over the territory.
In my view, the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people, by
virtue of its substantive aspect, should be seen as the principal legal status
of the self-determination unit. Even besides the connection and commonalities
between the principles of state sovereignty and self-determination, it is the
only possible legal status. Historically, there is no other principal legal status
since the British mandate. In addition, no other legal status would be accept-
able now because of that same right of self-determination; any other state that
would claim legal rights over part of the territory of this self-determination
unit would be condemned by the international community for breaching the
Palestinian people’s right of self-determination.
The different options for a legal status as discussed by Professor Scobbie
This being said, the different options discussed by Scobbie can be seen from
a different perspective. Besides the emergence of a sovereign Palestinian state,
he addresses and discards the possibility of the return of Egyptian rule.21
Indeed this is impossible, since the only title that Egypt had with respect to
the Gaza Strip was that of occupant. Returning to such a situation is not based
on any factual situation, as is required under the law of occupation.
Another possibility which is addressed and discarded is that of a third-
party administration. According to Scobbie, no third party has claimed rights
of sovereignty or administration following withdrawal.22 Quite logically so,
because such a ‘right’ on itself would be hard to reconcile with the right of
self-determination of the Palestinian people.
The last possibility which Scobbie addresses is that of the Gaza Strip
becoming terra nullius; territory unclaimed by any state.23 However, this
option would in its core be contrary to the substantive aspect of the right of
self-determination, which entails some form of territorial integrity. The territory
is claimed by a recognized entity, although not a state, and that claim is
recognized by the entire international community.
Another option for the legal status of the Gaza Strip
Indeed, all possibilities discussed by Scobbie prove to be in violation of prin-
ciples of international law and can therefore not be seen as real options.
However, accepting the view that the right of self-determination is in itself
the principal legal status of the Gaza Strip provides another option after the
end of occupation. It would mean that after the end of the Israeli occupation,
the Gaza Strip would be what it is already: a substantial part of a territorial
21 Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, p. 26, 27.
22 Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, p. 26, 27.
23 Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, p. 26.
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self-determination unit, which is progressing towards statehood, but has not
yet fully exercised its right of self-determination.
Such a principal legal status would be very exceptional under international
law. However, the legal reality of the Middle-East is nothing less then ex-
ceptional. I am of the opinion that such a exceptional status is warranted for
the following reasons. If indeed the effective control of Israel over the Gaza
Strip would end, there would be no basis for the qualification of the situation
as constituting occupation. Only a very strained interpretation of the instru-
ments and the whole nature of the law of occupation would make such a
conclusion possible. On the other hand, the recognized right of self-determina-
tion, as an obligation erga omnes and perhaps even with the status of ius cogens,
would form a much more solid and authoritative basis for the legal status of
the Gaza Strip as part of a territorial self-determination unit.
The arguments of Professor Scobbie reviewed from the proposed perspective
The arguments that Scobbie presents for his view that the ending of occupation
would violate the law of self-determination, will now have to be reviewed
from the different perspective introduced above.
By accepting the principal legal status of the self-determination unit, the
argument that the ending of occupation would violate the exercise of the
process of self-determination is without merit. The ending of occupation would
not force the Palestinian people to exercise their right. On the contrary: the
ending of occupation, and thereby the ending of the violation of the right of
self-determination in that part of the territorial unit, would only stimulate
progress of the exercise of this right. It gives the Palestinian people more than
ever the opportunity to determine freely their political status without external
interference.
In that respect, the examples that Professor Scobbie mentions for the
statement that unilateral action of an occupant cannot be seen as the exercise
of the right of self-determination are irrelevant, since they all refer to an
occupant which intends to alter the principal legal status which the territory
had before it became occupied instead of with the factual ending of effective
control.24 The same is true with respect to the quotation from the ICRC Com-
mentary,25 which, when read in context, deals with the intention to annex
the territory or to create a state, instead of with the release of effective control
over the territory.26
The argument that the substantive aspect of the right of self-determination
is violated, would then also be without legal merit. The core of the substantive
aspect is that there is no difference between the legal status of the Gaza Strip
and the West Bank. It is not the ending of occupation of part of that territorial
24 Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, p. 24, 25.
25 Commentary Pictet 1958, p. 63.
26 Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, p. 25.
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unit which violates this substantive aspect, but the continuing occupation of
the West Bank. However, this violation changes nothing to the legal status
of the territory. In addition, to assert that a violation of the right of self-deter-
mination should continue because those violations also continue on the rest
of the territorial unit is illogical.
The third argument remains fully valid. If a sovereign Palestinian state
would emerge, with the Gaza Strip as the only territory of that state, then the
creation of that state would violate the discussed aspects of self-determination.
However, no sovereign state emerges on the Gaza Strip when one accepts the
proposed point of view. Moreover, when the Gaza Strip would be an inde-
pendent part of a non-state self-determination unit, arguably it is possible that
a sovereign state could emerge on the whole of the territorial unit, including
the still occupied West Bank. Sovereignty can co-exist with occupation. This
legal theory is questionable because of the necessary effective control of the
sovereign, and in practice it would be as practically impossible as it would
be politically undesirable. Nevertheless, in discussing the future of a Palestinian
state, legal theory should be taken into account.
Other considerations contrary to Professor Scobbie’s conclusion
There are some other considerations which seem contrary to the conclusion
of Professor Scobbie. A factual act like occupation, contrary to a legal act such
as declaration of statehood, cannot simply be declared legally void simply
because it violates the law of self-determination. Because of the factual nature
of occupation and the presupposed effective control, it can only be declared
illegal. And even if occupation is established illegally, it is still occupation.
Likewise, if occupation in some way is ended illegally it cannot be declared
void since it is still the factual end of occupation.
Furthermore, Professor Scobbie’s conclusion could place a severe strain
on the law of occupation. If the applicability of the law of occupation, as part
of humanitarian law, or ius in bello, could entail that one party to the conflict
suddenly becomes solely responsible for the right of self-determination of the
people under occupation, the will of parties to declare this law applicable
would be diminished even further.
Seeing the legal status of the OPT as either occupied or a sovereign
Palestinian state, does not do justice to the obligation erga omnes which the
law of self-determination entails.27 This would imply that Israel has the sole
responsibility for the realisation of the Palestinian state through its release
of the effective control over the whole of the OPT. This is comparable to a
sovereign title over such a territorial unit, which Israel does not possess. A
more active role and responsibility of the international community in the
promotion of the right of self-determination is justified, since it creates an
27 Scobbie in 11 YIMEL, p. 11, 21.
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obligation erga omnes. This approach is enabled through the proposed view
that the legal status of the Gaza Strip is that of part of a non-state self-deter-
mination unit. Perhaps a role could be played by the United Nations, as was
also intended for East-Jerusalem under the 1947 UN Partition Plan.
11 Conclusion: Is the Gaza Strip still occupied
territory after the Disengagement?
11.1 COMMON RULES OF APPLICABILITY
It was already concluded in chapter 7 that both the Hague Regulations and
the Fourth Geneva Convention are de jure applicable to the situation in the
Gaza Strip and that the situation constitutes occupation under both instru-
ments.1 The question remains whether Israel still has effective control in the
meaning of the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention in the
changed factual situation, created by the implementation of the Plan.
It has been stated repeatedly that military presence is not in itself a con-
dition for the maintenance of occupation. But, in order for its control to be
effective, the occupying power must be able to enforce it.2 Therefore, for the
question if occupation exists, it is relevant whether Israel maintained enough
military capability in and around the Gaza Strip to enforce its control over
the Gaza Strip.
For the assessment of the situation, the focus will be on the amount of
control that Israel has, instead of the amount of control that the authorities
of the Gaza Strip have. The reason for this is that occupation is a factual
situation, in which the facts are assessed from the viewpoint of the occupant.3
Thus, the focus is on the occupant and on the amount of control which this
occupant has, instead of on the lack of control of the legitimate authority of
the territory. The criterion of effective control is thereby formulated as a
positive question, of which the answer is easier to determine than of a negative
one. Accordingly, it is much better documented which control is still exercised
by Israel than what control is exercised by the authorities of the Gaza Strip
and what control is not.4
If the control is considered effective under the Hague Regulations, it can
certainly be considered as such under the Fourth Geneva Convention.5 Further-
more, as is stated in chapters 6 and 7 of this essay, the ICJ has determined that
the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the OPT is governed by
article 6 paragraph 3 of that convention. This entails that only a limited amount
1 Paragraph 7.2; paragraph 7.3.
2 Paragraph 2.5.2; paragraph 6.1; paragraph 6.2.
3 Paragraph 6.2.
4 Chapter 9.
5 Paragraph 3.5.2.
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of provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention can be applicable to the situ-
ation in the OPT. These provisions are only applicable when the occupant
exercises the functions of government in the occupied territory, and thus has
HR-effective control.6 Nevertheless, both the Hague Regulations and the Fourth
Geneva Convention will be discussed separately in this chapter in order to
illustrate the different legal theories on the existence of occupation under these
instruments.
11.2 ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE HAGUE
REGULATIONS
Occupation in the meaning of the Hague Regulations exists when the territory
is brought under the effective control of a party to an international conflict
by means of that party’s military presence. Control is considered effective in
the meaning of the Hague Regulations when the occupant exerts control over
the government functions.7
11.2.1 Control over the government functions
The external security of the Gaza Strip
The possibility for the Palestinian authority of the Gaza Strip to manage its
external security is non-existent. It is completely dependent on the Israeli
military forces for the guarding of the external land parameter.8 The guarding
of the external land parameter is implemented by deploying Israeli armed
forces on the territory of the Gaza Strip.9 Israel has full control over the air-
space of the Gaza Strip, as well as over the territorial waters.10 Israel has
armed military forces present and active in the territorial waters, in the airspace
and on the territory of the Gaza Strip.11 This is sufficient evidence that the
external security of the Gaza Strip is under the control of Israel. Ironically
enough, Israel can be seen as the biggest external threat to the population of
the Gaza Strip.
Control over the border crossings of the Gaza Strip
Israel maintains an exceptionally high level of control over the border crossings
of the Gaza Strip. Israel controls all border crossings between Israel and the
6 Paragraph 6.4; paragraph 7.4; see also paragraphs 3.7 and 4.3.2.
7 Paragraph 6.3.
8 Paragraph 8.4.1; paragraph 8.4.2.
9 Paragraph 9.3.
10 Paragraph 8.4.1.
11 Paragraph 9.2; paragraph 9.3.
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Gaza strip.12 It uses this control actively by closing down crossings for large
periods of time. Movement of persons and goods is completely under the
control of Israel through the control over the crossings and the control over
the population register.13 Israel retains some influence on the Rafah crossing,
which is hard to reconcile with the territorial sovereignty of the Gaza Strip.14
However, the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt is no longer under
the direct control of Israel.
Together with the fact that there are no operational airports and seaports
available for the movement of persons and goods from the Gaza Strip to other
states,15 it can be concluded that Israel has control over the border crossings
of the Gaza Strip.
Legislation and administration
Israel maintains control over the population register. This is a very important
part of the administration, since it is directly connected to the issuance of
identity documents which are also used as travel documents.16 In addition
to that, Israel’s continued control over the monetary system of the Gaza Strip
gives Israel the power to enact legislation in the Gaza Strip on monetary affairs,
regardless of the opinion of the authorities of the Gaza Strip.17 Israel also
maintains considerable control on the tax and customs regime in the Gaza
Strip.18 Thus, it can be concluded that Israel does not control all aspects of
the administration and legislation of the Gaza Strip, but it does control some
important aspects of it.
Providing basic facilities for the population
Sewage networks, telecommunication networks, water supplies and electricity
supplies are under the control of Israel.19 In addition, through its control over
the external parameter of the Gaza Strip, Israel controls the basic food and
medical supplies for the Gaza Strip.20 Israel threatens to use, and indeed uses,
this control to influence the authorities and population of the Gaza Strip.21
Thus, it is clear that the basic facilities for the population are under the Israeli
control.
12 Paragraph 8.4.2; paragraph 9.3.
13 Paragraph 9.3; paragraph 9.4.
14 Paragraph 8.4.2; paragraph 9.3.
15 Paragraph 8.3.
16 Paragraph 9.4.
17 Paragraph 8.4.3 ; paragraph 9.4.
18 Paragraph 8.4.3; paragraph 9.4.
19 Paragraph 9.4.
20 Paragraph 9.3.
21 Paragraph 9.3; paragraph 9.4.
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The development of the economic system
Without the active cooperation of Israel, the economy of the Gaza Strip cannot
develop sufficiently. With the active opposition of Israel, the economy of the
Gaza Strip will not develop at all. Israel controls all aspects of import and
export of the Gaza Strip,22 it controls the fishing in the territorial waters of
the Gaza Strip23 and it controls the flow of workers to Israel and the West
Bank including East-Jerusalem.24 Thus Israel controls all possibilities for the
development of the economy of the Gaza Strip.
11.2.2 The military aspect; the enforcement of the control over the Gaza Strip
Israel must be capable to enforce its control over all the above mentioned
government functions for that control to be effective. For this, it is necessary
that it has enough military capability in and around the Gaza Strip to launch
military actions or pose a sufficient military threat. In my view there is no
doubt that Israel has enough military forces deployed around the Gaza Strip
to enforce its control when necessary. The fact that Israeli armed forces are
present in the territorial waters, the air space and the border areas of Gaza
Strip territory strengthens my opinion.25 Furthermore, military actions in the
Gaza Strip take place on a daily basis; in the border areas of the Gaza Strip
as well as in its residential areas.26 The military threat that Israel poses to
the population in the Gaza Strip by the presence and actions of the armed
forces in and around the Gaza Strip must be deemed sufficient by any
standard.
11.2.3 Conclusion: the Gaza Strip is occupied in the meaning of the Hague
Regulations
Based on the findings in the previous two paragraphs, it is without doubt that
Israel has effective control over the government functions of the Gaza Strip
and has sufficient means to enforce this effective control when necessary. The
fact that Israel does not control all government functions is irrelevant, since
the functions which are under Israeli control are some of the most vital to a
developing territory and are sufficient to enforce its will upon the occupied
22 Paragraph 8.4.3; paragraph 9.3; paragraph 9.4.
23 Paragraph 8.4.1; paragraph 8.4.2; paragraph 9.2.
24 Paragraph 8.4.2; paragraph 9.3.
25 Paragraph 8.4.1; paragraph 9.2; paragraph 9.3.
26 Paragraph 9.2.
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territory. The fact that there no longer is an official Israeli military government
in the Gaza Strip is also irrelevant.27
11.3 ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE FOURTH
GENEVA CONVENTION
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, If the control is considered effective
under the Hague Regulations, it can certainly be considered as such under
the Fourth Geneva Convention.28 However, for the benefit of the legal analysis
of the law of occupation, the situation in the Gaza Strip will also be assessed
from the viewpoint of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Occupation according to the Fourth Geneva Convention exists when the
population of a territory is brought under the effective control of a party to
an international conflict by means of that party’s military presence. Control
is considered effective under the Fourth Geneva Convention when the people
of a territory are in fact under such control, that the protection of the law of
occupation as laid down in the Fourth Geneva Convention is warranted.29
11.3.1 The civilians in the Gaza Strip can be qualified as Protected Persons
The civilian population in the Gaza Strip can easily be qualified as Protected
Persons as defined in article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Israel nega-
tively influences the physical wellbeing of the population with its military
actions and border control.30 In addition, Israel negatively influences the
economic wellbeing of the population through its control over import and
export, its hampering of the freedom of movement and its military actions
in the Gaza Strip.31 Israel also negatively influences the social wellbeing of
the population of the Gaza Strip with its military actions and the hampering
of the freedom of movement.32
11.3.2 Influence on the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip
Important aspects of the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip which are
protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention are under the control of Israel.
27 Paragraph 6.3.
28 Paragraph 3.5.2.
29 Paragraph 6.4.
30 Paragraph 9.2; paragraph 9.3.
31 Paragraph 8.4.2; paragraph 8.4.3; paragraph 9.2; paragraph 9.3; paragraph 9.4.
32 Paragraph 9.2; paragraph 9.3; paragraph 9.4.
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One indication for the conclusion that this convention should remain applic-
able, is that Israel remains responsible for approximately 650 prisoners from
the Gaza Strip who must be returned by Israel at the end of occupation.33
Another important indication for that conclusion is Israel’s continuing full
control over the supply of basic humanitarian needs to the population of the
Gaza Strip. These include medical and food supplies, as well as the supply
of electricity and of water to the Gaza Strip.34 Providing such supplies, and
thus also allowing these into the occupied territory, is mandatory under the
Fourth Geneva Convention.35
11.3.3 Sovereignty of the people is under the control of Israel
Control over the sovereignty of the people largely overlaps the condition for
control over government functions under the Hague Regulations, as discussed
above.36 However, it can also be construed more broadly, thereby including
Israel’s actions which would be flagrant breaches of the principles of non-
intervention and territorial sovereignty of the Gaza Strip, if it would be part
of a state.37 Also, the interfering of Israel with the maintenance of the
international relations by Gaza Strip authorities, as described in previous
chapters, can be seen as an indication of Israel’s overall control over the
sovereignty of the people of the Gaza Strip.38
11.3.4 The military aspect; the enforcement of the control over the Gaza Strip
As stated in paragraph 10.2.2 the military aspect of occupation is definitely
satisfied by the military presence, actions and the overall military threat which
is exerted by Israeli armed forces. There are military forces present in the
occupied territory, there are military forces deployed all around the occupied
territory and military incursions are made frequently on occupied territory.39
33 Paragraph 3.5.3; paragraph 9.4.
34 Paragraph 8.4.1; paragraph 8.4.2; paragraph 8.4.3; paragraph 9.3; paragraph 9.4.
35 Paragraph 3.5.3.
36 Paragraph 6.4; paragraph 11.2.
37 Paragraph 8.4.1; paragraph 8.4.2; paragraph 8.4.3.
38 Paragraph 8.4.1; paragraph 9.3.
39 Paragraph 8.3; paragraph 9.2; paragraph 10.2.2.
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11.3.5 Conclusion: the Gaza Strip is occupied in the meaning of the Fourth
Geneva Convention
In most cases, the separate indicators for control as discussed in the paragraphs
above might not be enough to constitute occupation. However, when all
indicators are seen as a whole, the evidence for effective control over the Gaza
Strip by Israel is overwhelming. This is no surprise since it was already con-
cluded that all conditions for occupation to exist under the Hague Regulations
fulfilled as well. Even when analysed separately from this previous conclusion,
there is no doubt that the Gaza Strip remains occupied in the sense of the
Fourth Geneva Convention.
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Annex
Israeli disengagement plan
The Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan of 6 June 2004
Addendum A - Revised Disengagement Plan - Main Principles
Paragraph 1. Background - Political and Security Implications
The State of Israel is committed to the peace process and aspires to reach an agreed
resolution of the conflict based upon the vision of US President George Bush.
The State of Israel believes that it must act to improve the current situation. The State
of Israel has come to the conclusion that there is currently no reliable Palestinian partner
with which it can make progress in a two-sided peace process. Accordingly, it has
developed a plan of revised disengagement (hereinafter - the plan), based on the
following considerations:
One. The stalemate dictated by the current situation is harmful. In order to break out
of this stalemate, the State of Israel is required to initiate moves not dependent on
Palestinian cooperation.
Two. The purpose of the plan is to lead to a better security, political, economic and
demographic situation.
Three. In any future permanent status arrangement, there will be no Israeli towns and
villages in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, it is clear that in the West Bank, there
are areas which will be part of the State of Israel, including major Israeli population
centers, cities, towns and villages, security areas and other places of special interest
to Israel.
Four. The State of Israel supports the efforts of the United States, operating alongside
the international community, to promote the reform process, the construction of institu-
tions and the improvement of the economy and welfare of the Palestinian residents,
in order that a new Palestinian leadership will emerge and prove itself capable of
fulfilling its commitments under the Roadmap.
Five. Relocation from the Gaza Strip and from an area in Northern Samaria should
reduce friction with the Palestinian population.
Six. The completion of the plan will serve to dispel the claims regarding Israel’s respons-
ibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.
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Seven. The process set forth in the plan is without prejudice to the relevant agreements
between the State of Israel and the Palestinians. Relevant arrangements shall continue
to apply.
Eight. International support for this plan is widespread and important. This support
is essential in order to bring the Palestinians to implement in practice their obligations
to combat terrorism and effect reforms as required by the Roadmap, thus enabling
the parties to return to the path of negotiation.
Paragraph 2. Main Elements
A. The process: The required preparatory work for the implementation of the plan
will be carried out (including staff work to determine criteria, definitions, evaluations,
and preparations for required legislation).
Immediately upon completion of the preparatory work, a discussion will be held by
the Government in order to make a decision concerning the relocation of settlements,
taking into consideration the circumstances prevailing at that time – whether or not
to relocate, and which settlements.
The towns and villages will be classified into four groups, as follows:
Group A - Morag, Netzarim, Kfar Darom
Group B - the villages of Northern Samaria (Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur and Homesh).
Group C - the towns and villages of Gush Katif
Group D - the villages of the Northern Gaza Strip (Elei Sinai, Dugit and Nissanit)
It is clarified that, following the completion of the aforementioned preparations, the
Government will convene periodically in order to decide separately on the question
of whether or not to relocate, with respect to each of the aforementioned groups.
2.3. The continuation of the aforementioned process is subject to the resolutions that
the Government will pass, as mentioned above in Article 2, and will be implemented
in accordance with the content of those resolutions.
2.3.1 The Gaza Strip
1) The State of Israel will evacuate the Gaza Strip, including all existing Israeli towns
and villages, and will redeploy outside the Strip. This will not include military deploy-
ment in the area of the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt ("the Philadelphi
Route") as detailed below.
2) Upon completion of this process, there shall no longer be any permanent presence
of Israeli security forces in the areas of Gaza Strip territory which have been evacuated.
2.3.2 The West Bank
3) The State of Israel will evacuate an area in Northern Samaria (Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur
and Homesh), and all military installations in this area, and will redeploy outside the
vacated area.
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4) Upon completion of this process, there shall no longer be any permanent presence
of Israeli security forces in this area.
5) The move will enable territorial contiguity for Palestinians in the Northern Samaria
area.
6) The State of Israel will assist, together with the international community, in im-
proving the transportation infrastructure in the West Bank in order to facilitate the
contiguity of Palestinian transportation.
7) The process will facilitate normal life and Palestinian economic and commercial
activity in the West Bank.
2.3.3 The intention is to complete the planned relocation process by the end of 2005.
B. The Security Fence: The State of Israel will continue building the Security Fence,
in accordance with the relevant decisions of the Government. The route will take into
account humanitarian considerations.
Paragraph 3. Security Situation Following the Relocation
3.1. The Gaza Strip:
1) The State of Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza
Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue
to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip.
2) The Gaza Strip shall be demilitarized and shall be devoid of weaponry, the presence
of which does not accord with the Israeli-Palestinian agreements.
3) The State of Israel reserves its fundamental right of self-defense, both preventive
and reactive, including where necessary the use of force, in respect of threats emanating
from the Gaza Strip.
3.2. The West Bank:
1) Upon completion of the evacuation of the Northern Samaria area, no permanent
Israeli military presence will remain in this area.
2) The State of Israel reserves its fundamental right of self-defense, both preventive
and reactive, including where necessary the use of force, in respect of threats emanating
from the Northern Samaria area.
3) In other areas of the West Bank, current security activity will continue. However,
as circumstances require, the State of Israel will consider reducing such activity in
Palestinian cities.
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4) The State of Israel will work to reduce the number of internal checkpoints throughout
the West Bank.
Paragraph 4.Military Installations and Infrastructure in theGaza Strip andNorthern
Samaria
In general, these will be dismantled and evacuated, with the exception of those which
the State of Israel decides to transfer to another party.
Paragraph 5. Security Assistance to the Palestinians
The State of Israel agrees that by coordination with it, advice, assistance and training
will be provided to the Palestinian security forces for the implementation of their
obligations to combat terrorism and maintain public order, by American, British,
Egyptian, Jordanian or other experts, as agreed therewith.
No foreign security presence may enter the Gaza Strip and/or the West Bank without
being coordinated with and approved by the State of Israel.
Paragraph 6. The Border Area Between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (Philadelphi Route)
The State of Israel will continue to maintain a military presence along the border
between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (Philadelphi Route). This presence is an essential
security requirement. At certain locations, security considerations may require some
widening of the area in which the military activity is conducted.
Subsequently, the evacuation of this area will be considered. Evacuation of the area
will be dependent, inter alia, on the security situation and the extent of cooperation
with Egypt in establishing a reliable alternative arrangement.
If and when conditions permit the evacuation of this area, the State of Israel will be
willing to consider the possibility of the establishment of a seaport and airport in the
Gaza Strip, in accordance with arrangements to be agreed with Israel.
Paragraph 7. Real Estate Assets
In general, residential dwellings and sensitive structures, including synagogues, will
not remain. The State of Israel will aspire to transfer other facilities, including industrial,
commercial and agricultural ones, to a third, international party which will put them
to use for the benefit of the Palestinian population that is not involved in terror.
The area of the Erez industrial zone will be transferred to the responsibility of an agreed
upon Palestinian or international party.
The State of Israel will explore, together with Egypt, the possibility of establishing a
joint industrial zone on the border of the Gaza Strip, Egypt and Israel.
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Paragraph 8. Civil Infrastructure and Arrangements
Infrastructure relating to water, electricity, sewage and telecommunications will remain
in place.
In general, Israel will continue, for full price, to supply electricity, water, gas and petrol
to the Palestinians, in accordance with current arrangements.
Other existing arrangements, such as those relating to water and the electro-magnetic
sphere shall remain in force.
Paragraph 9. Activity of Civilian International Organizations
The State of Israel recognizes the great importance of the continued activity of inter-
national humanitarian organizations and others engaged in civil development, assisting
the Palestinian population.
The State of Israel will coordinate with these organizations arrangements to facilitate
their activities.
The State of Israel proposes that an international apparatus be established (along the
lines of the AHLC), with the agreement of Israel and international elements which will
work to develop the Palestinian economy.
Paragraph 10. Economic Arrangements
In general, the economic arrangements currently in operation between the State of Israel
and the Palestinians shall remain in force. These arrangements include, inter alia:
One. The entry and exit of goods between the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the State of
Israel and abroad.
Two. The monetary regime.
Three. Tax and customs envelope arrangements.
Four. Postal and telecommunications arrangements.
Five. The entry of workers into Israel, in accordance with the existing criteria.
In the longer term, and in line with Israel’s interest in encouraging greater Palestinian
economic independence, the State of Israel expects to reduce the number of Palestinian
workers entering Israel, to the point that it ceases completely. The State of Israel
supports the development of sources of employment in the Gaza Strip and in Palestinian
areas of the West Bank, by international elements.
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Paragraph 11. International Passages
a. The International Passage Between the Gaza Strip and Egypt
1) The existing arrangements shall continue.
2) The State of Israel is interested in moving the passage to the "three borders" area,
south of its current location. This would need to be effected in coordination with the
Government of Egypt. This move would enable the hours of operation of the passage
to be extended.
b. The International Passages Between the West Bank and Jordan:
The existing arrangements shall continue.
Paragraph 12. Erez Crossing Point
The Erez crossing point will be moved to a location within Israel in a time frame to
be determined separately by the Government.
Paragraph 13. Conclusion
The goal is that implementation of the plan will lead to improving the situation and
breaking the current deadlock. If and when there is evidence from the Palestinian side
of its willingness, capability and implementation in practice of the fight against terror-
ism, full cessation of terrorism and violence and the institution of reform as required
by the Road Map, it will be possible to return to the track of negotiation and dialogue.
* * *
As published on the Website of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs [some clarifications
with regard to structure have been added]
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